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lOHANNIS WYCLIF

TRACTATUS

DE LOGICA.

NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE VIENNA AND PRAGUE MSS.

(VIENNA 4352; UNIV. PRAG. V. E. 14.) BY

MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI.

VOL. III.

LONDON.

PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOGIETY BY TRtJBNER & Co.

PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD.

1899. JOHNSON REPRINT CORPORATION MINERVA, G.m.b.H.

NEW YORK AND LONDON FRANKFURT AM MAIN

Contents of Introduction.

I. Preliminary Remarks p. V.

II. General view of the work p. • V.

III. Analysis of Vol. III. a) Chapter IX p. IX.

h) Chapter X p. XXV.

IV. Conclusion: The gist of the Nominalistic controversy . p. XXXVI.

«OSTON COLLEGE LIBRARY CHESTNUT HILL. MASS

6K.

First reprinting, 1966

Printed in the United States of America

INTRODUCTION.

I. Preliminary Remarks.

With the third vOlume of Logica, Wyclifs first great philosophical workcomes to a close. AII that should be said as regards the genuineness of the work and its date has already been said in the Introduction to Vol. I, and there is no need to repeat it here. As to the state of the manuscript, a few words may perhaps be allowed. Very illegible from the beginning, as stated in the Introductions to Vols. I and II^ it becomes worse and worse, sometimes intolerably so, as it approaches the end. This may account for, and to some extent excuse, the numerous short- comings of the present edition, which no one can regret more than the editor himself.

I wish to take this opportunity of again most sincerely thanking all those who have aided me in the work; especially Dr. Furnivall, tlie Founder of the WycHf Society; and Mr. Matthew, whose notes have more than once been of great service.

The two chapters of Wyclifs book which make up the present volume were also copied as separate tractates. The last chapter, however, dealing with time, is quite distinct from the treatise De Indivi- diiacione Temporis, not yet published. Before entering into a detailed examination of the contents of these two chapters, I think it advisable to notice several matters of importance which may strike the reader on a perusal of the whole.

II. A General "View.

It is useless to deny that in many respects this third volume of Logica will be found unattractive, especially by such as have not made

VI INTRODUCTION.

a study of works of the kind. The wild boldness of the conclusions reached, the impossibility of conceiving what WycHf himself declares over and over again to be beyond the scope of mathematical specu- lation, although it deals with Space and Time; above all, the strange- ness of Wyclifs standpoint, so foreign to all our modern ideas of Natural Philosophy — will often, no doubt, confuse the reader, and lead him to pass over unnoticed the many excellent qualities, both of subtlety and of depth of thought, with which this volume abounds. I myself, though long engaged in the preparation of this edition, thought at first that the two tractates on Space and Time were merely side- issues that might have been lopped off from Wyclifs philosophy without disadvantage to the whole. But on further consideration my opinion has been very much modified. His theory of Time and Space appears to me now as a logical result, partly of his Realism, pardy of his doctrine concerning maxima and minima ; and this same theory is, I think, the root from which his doctrines on the Eucharist necessarily sprang. It is thus essentially linked with his fundamental doctrines; but it is at the same time a link, indissolubly connecting them with the further develop- ments of his theological ideas.

When WycHf affirmed the objective reaHty of all universals, he at once encountered a considerable difficulty in dealing with the phenomenon of extension. NominaHsts, if consistent, say that not only points, but lines, surfaces, and even volumes, are all entia rationis — mere fig- ments of our mind. For a volume is a Universal — One in Many — containing an infmite multitude of surfaces ; a surface, again, is the uni- versal of the line; and the line is in Hke manner the universal of the point. And for the same reason that they denied this reaHty, Wyclif was obliged to maintain it. As to points, they must be real things too, though not universal, since the line is nothing more than a series of points, and is made up of them: at all events, being something in that which is real, they must be real too. Now, as we have seen in the two former volumes, WycHf abjures the doctrine of the indefinitely great, and roundly asserts that there is a maximum and a minimum for all things. A maxi- mum of size: therefore space is not absolutely infinite, but only rela- tively so — relatively to us. There is also a minimum of size, which of course is the point. Now, what are those real coundess points, which fiU all space, and of which all space consists? They are surely not

INTRODUCTION. VII

spiritual. But, if material, how can material substance coexist in the same space as they? We have to explain how the world fills space, which is already filled by these punctal reaHties.

The answer, however bold it may seem, is but the outcome of the difficulty just stated, working in Wychfs mind, already imbued with the doctrines I have mentioned above. Matter is made up of atoms, each atom consisting of a number of points, really distinct from one another, really without length, breadth, or thickness, and yet really touching each other. One point cannot make length; two begin to make it; their essence is to have position of their own, and so, though they touch, they do not coincide. This non-coincidence is the beginning of length. Two points do not make a surface, but three do (inchoatively) if the third is not in a line with the other two; and this is the beginning of the plane, and indeed of all surfaces whatsoever. A fourth point not in the same plane as the other three would be the beginning of volume. Such are the primordial atoms, which correspond to every point and in fact are every point in space, for no vacuum is possible. And, were there any real difference between the reality of mathematical and that of material points, they would clash together. In short, mathematical points are real and material; therefore, there can be no others. Co- penetration, WycHf asserts, is an absolute impossibiHty.

If then a vacuum is inconceivable, and space is the same thing as matter, it follows that, beyond the circumference by which our universe is bounded, there is no space at all, and that the conception of a straight line, indefinitely producible, is but a contradiction in terms. The world being the greatest amount of matter possible, nothing greater can exist; nor can its size be diminished, for then it would no longer be the greatest possible.

Here we come to the point where this development of Wyclifs Realistic doctrines comes in contact — if not in conflict — with the dogma of Transubstantiation. If the size of the universe cannot be diminished, is the annihilation of any part of it admissible? Certainly not. Besides, to each of those points of which the universe consists, it is essential to have position somewhere; to annihilate one single point would be to take away, not only its existence, but its very essence too; or in less Scholastic terminology, it is as impossible to annihilate any portion of matter as to think away a part of space, which, when once

VIII INTRODUCTION.

created, is absolutely necessary, A further proof is in the impossibility of a vacuum: if a piece of bread be annihilated, what remains in its place? Nothing thinkable; ai>d, therefore, annihilation is unthinkable too.

WycHf is thus forced to deny that anything can be annihilated, even by Almighty Power, even absolutely coiisidered; and here we see the profound difference which separates him from the general opinion of Scholastic philosophers and theologians, who distinguish between what is possible to Omnipotence, irrespectively of God's other attributes, but are not all of one mind as to whether annihilation is absolutely impossible. They would wilHngly grant the truth of Milton's lines in the second book of Paradise Lost:

.... How He can Is doubtful; that He never will, is sure. But WycHf l:as no doubt at all on the matter.

Now, in the doctrine of Transubstantiation, it is affirmed that the bread ceases to exist. This (though some Doctors of great note, Aquinas amongst others, explain it in a different manner) certainly seems to point to annihilation, as was very probably admitted by Wyclifs Nominalistic opponents. At any rate, the assertion that the whole substance of the bread ceases to exist at a given instant — both as to its substantial quaHties and the underlying substratum of those qualities — could, in Wyclifs system, be understood only as the annihilation of the atoms of vvhich it consists. This had to be denied. The bread, it was affirmed, ceased to exist as bread; in its place there remained a body that Wyclif (no doubt out of respect for the dogma which he still seemed to admit) called a corptis niathematicum. I say, 'still seemed to admit'; for, as we have seen, this corpus mathematicum, quite orthodox enough in the ordinary sense of the words, is nothing else but the atoms, or mathe- matical points, of which the bread consists, just as they were before. Any one who will read p. 137 of the present volume will, I think, be convinced that the successive stages of WycHf s opinions in this matter, as given by Wodeford (see De Benedicta Incarnacione, ed. Mr. Harris, Int. IX.) were successive only in the mode of expression, not in the thing itself. The same esse, he says, which was previously that of bread, becomes sacramentally the Body of Christ. True, he also says that it does not remain bread after consecration, and explains himself no further; but the indestructibility of the bread-atoms has already been

INTRODUCTION. IX

posited. 'J'hey are tlie subject of the accidental (jualities which we perceive; ainl though Wychf calls tliem a corpns malheniaticnni, they are real objective existences, and not the atoms of Christ's Rody. Tliat Body, as I pointed out in the Introduction to De Apostasia, is present tlierc as a symbol — and is therefore really present with the reahty of a symbol — but not otherwise. Is not this in substance the very same theory tliat WycHf expounds in his later works? There is indeed a com- plete chang-e of language and style, though even so late as in the tractate Dc Apostasia, he continues to employ the term transubstantiation; but liere, even from the very outset, he refuses to admit that anything in the physical substance of the bread has been changed.

Such are the most important points in this third volume ofLogica; their bearing both upon what preceded them and what followed, justifies me, I think, in setting them before the reader in connected form. Here and there, we also fmd certain other allusions, paragraphs upon necessity and free-will, a word or two against the abuse of ceremonies and the excess of riches in the Church, and other signs which show what was already fermenting in Wyclifs mind; but they are mere side-issues, and not (so far as I can see now) essentially connected with his system. They will, therefore, be more advantageously considered in their place, as we go on to the detailed examination of the two last chapters of Wychfs Logica.

III. Analysis of the Work.

a) Ghapter IX.

Short Summary of the Contents.

Local propositions (p. 1 — 11). Movenient defined and divided (p. 11 — 27). — Other divisions of inovement (27 — 30). — Is ihe Continuous niade iip of points? Arguments pro (30 — 35). — Arguments contra, draivn froni Aristotles authorily (35 — 38); from geonietry (38 — 63) ; from physical science (63 — 70); from theology (70— 74); and from the fact of cheniical combination (74 — 85). — Wliat is the nieasure of the velocity of motion? Wyclifs opinion (85 — 87). — General argunients contra (87 — 100). — Astronomical objections (100 111). — Of Augmentation (111—116). — Difftculties (116—118). — Of Alteration (118-121). — Objections refuted (121-132).

X INTRODUCTION.

Local propositions. Place may be taken to mean merely position (i). The v/orld consists of atoms, cannot be increased nor diminished in size, nor moved, nor changed in shape. The whole of space is the whole world; partial spaces are made up of points. To each point corresponds a place, which is fixed, whereas the points are all movable, and may enter it, one after the other (i, 2). It is a mere relation of distance from the poles and the centre of the world (3). The universe is the common place of everything; yet each of its parts has its own partial site (3, 4). Two bodies may thus be in the same place in one sense, and in another, in quite dififerent and separate places (5). Site and situa- tion are not identical, except at the poles and at the centre (6). Posi- tion depends upon the distance of anything from the centre (6, 7). Animals, Hke the world, have in themselves these differences ofposition: above, below, back, front, right and left (7— 11).

Movement defmed and divided. Movement is the 'form', or per- fection, by which the mobility of a mobile becomes actualized ; local movement is but one of its many divisions (11). Local movement impHes a mover which is other than the thing moved ; this leads us to admit a First Motor, motionless, indivisible, everlasting (12, 13). Local movement may be straight, circular, &. (14, 15). Can we say that the same body has two different movements at once (16 — 18)? Not according to strict logic; but one movement may be considered as the combination of two others, and rest, as the result of two equal and contrary mo- tions (18 — 23). Every change which makes a body to differ from what it was, deserves to be called movement in a wide sense; and in a sense still wider, the activity of the intellect and the action of God upon His creatures, is movement (24). The swiftness of the movement of a body is represented by the space it would pass through in a given time, if not prevented. The impediment only counteracts the external effects which movement tends to cause, and therefore must count for nothing, even when so great as totally to destroy the effect (25). Supposing the sun to have a retrograde movement on the celestial sphere as rapid as the forward motion of the sphere itself, there would be no apparent motion of the sun from east to west, though it would move from north to south (26). Wyclif here alludes to the fact that the sun is higher in the sky in summer than in winter. The effect of which he speaks would be produced, in the language of modern astronomy, if the earth, whilst

INTRODUCTION. XI

continuing to revolve round the sun, ceased to rotate on its axis. The sun would be for ever in the same meridian; but in summer it would be seen higher in the sky — that is, nearer the North Pole; — in autumn, it would go lower — that is, nearer the South Pole — until it disappeared beneath the horizon for six months. This supposition aids WycHf to explain the sun's yearly apparent passage through the signs of the zodiac, by imagining an eastward movement, which in some un- known manner is delayed to the extent of about one degree every day; while the sun's position in the sky changes at the same time from North to South, or vice versa.

Other diviswns of movement. WycHf here deals only with local movement, uniform or varied; and if varied, varied either in itself or in its subject. If the world revolves with a movement that seems uniform, each part of the world turns round with a differenl degree of rapidity, except at the poles, where the movement is nil. AU these various rapi- dities of movement may at once be predicated of their one subject — the world. It thus at the same time moves faster and slower than itself: which of course, with the above explanation, is evidently true. WycUf goes farther, and asserts that the motion of a part may be equal to, though less than, that of the whole; notwithstanding that this admission lends a handle to sophistical objections. A movement smaller in velocity ^ is equal to the whole movement in duration. The circular movement of a part of the world near the poles is much less rapid than at the Equator; yet both take place in 24 hours (28). Movement is again either uniformly or variably varied ; and once more the old mediaeval distinction

1 /m velodty. The assertion that a part of any movement is equal to the whole is explained in the text by the distinction: quoad molem — quoad duracionem. I find it difficult to understand. The sense, as I give it above, does not, I confess, agree well with quoad molem; it ought to be quoad velocitatem. But we might understand the words thus: Movement in one atom only (a part of the whole movement quoad molem) is equal to the movement of the whole body moved. But then, why does Wyclif use the words quoad duracionem? They ought again in this case to be changed for quoad velocitatem. I think that the explanation, as given above, answers better to the general drift of the argument. Either way, we see how may be maintained that a partial movement is equal to its whole. — I may here, by the way, repeat what I pointed out in the Introduction to Logica, Vol. II, viz. that I in this analysis often introduce comparisons or remarks of may own, in order to clear up what is not clear, or to reconcile seeming discrepancies.

XII INTRODUCTION.

of movement Saried in tlie subject' comes in. Movement variably varied may be so in infinite manners, and endless new species of movement are thus conceivable. At this stage of the enquiry, WycHf proposes three questions; thc first, dealing with succession, is to be solved in the foUow- ing chapter; the second concerns the Continuous, and the third, the measure of velocity of motion, and will be answered here (29, 30).

Is the Continuous made up of points? Argmnnits pro. — • If the world consists of atoms which in their turn consist of indivisible points, ^ how can we explain the existence of the Continuous, which is indefmitely divisible? How can the Extended be made up of elements which are in no wise extended? But Wyclif says that it must be so, and gives seven arguments to prove it. — i. The intrinsic cause of anything is necessarily a part of that thing; now points cause lines, lines surfaces, and surfaces volumes; thus points are parts of space, and it is ulti- mately composed of them. — 2. Either points are not, or they are, parts of lines; if not, all the points in a line could be taken away without shortening it: a manifest absurdity. — 3- If two bodies touch in one point onl)'-, we have two points which touch one another, and yet are distinct (as belonging to different bodies); that is, they are not in the same place. So v.^e see that 'to touch' does not mean 'to coincide', and the possibility of space consisting of contiguous points is saved (30, 31), — 4. An instant is to divisible continuous time what a point is to a divisible continuous line; but one instant is not identical with the next immediately following it: consequently, neither is one point identical with another that it touches. And if so, the point is, not the negation, but the element of the Continuous (31). — 5- A mobile, passing through two surfaces that touch — air, v. g. and water — will pass one after the other, and touch each of them at two indivisible instants of time, distinct, though not separated by any interval. Other suppositions lead

1 Boskowitch's theory of indivisiblc points — merc mathematical centrcs of attracticn — which is well-known to the philosophical world, would seem some- what similar to that of Wyclif. But there is an enormous difterence. Boskowitch's atoms do not touch, they cannot touch;- they act upon each other with attractive and repellent forces through a perfect vacuum. Thus his theory, though lying open to other objections, cannot be assailed by those which Wyclif here undertakes to refutc.

[NTRODUCTION. XIII

tu the same conclusion (^2). — 6. There are days and nights but one instant long (as at the poles). These days and nights are part of the continuity of time^ and yet are distinct from the rest of it; therefore they are real parts, which make up that continuity. And if Time is thus com- posed^ it is easy to show that space is composed Hkewise (33). — 7. If God, by His almighty Power, created a series of substances each the size of a mathematical point, and placed them side by side throughout the whole of space, we should have continuous extension; and nothing can be brought to prove that what is possible in this case is not a really existing fact (34). — Throughout the whole of these arguments, our author seems at times to take the idea of the absolutely inextended point — the Nothing of Space — and at others, that of a line divided by "a quantity that has increased beyond all measure". The latter, accord- ing to modern mathematicians, is not absolutely without length; only its length is shorter than the shortest Hne conceivable. Such infinitesimal magnitudes would indeed be factors of the Hne; but would they agree with WycHfs conception of the point, as an absolute minimum of bulk?

The Hne A, divided by 00, gives — ; but 2 A, divided in Hke manner,

00

2A gives — ; the second quantity is mathematicaHy double of the first. But

I leave these considerations to such as are versed in a science which, since five hundred years, has made such progress as WycHf never dreamed of.

Arguments contra: Aristotles view. — The difficulties which surround such a system are of course great and manifold. Aristotle seems against it; for instance, when he says that the Continuous is infinitely divisible. But, a) Aristotle speaks of that which is continuous to our senses; and that, so far as our senses can tell, is indeed made up of innumerable parts. But though infinite for us, they are not so to God. And, b) Ari- stotle distinctly says that the point is the cause of the Hne; if so, it must be its element, and this dictuni is quite in WycHfs favour (35). The doctrine of indivisible points transcends both our senses and our imagination. Geometry has nothing to do here, these points are beyond geometry; physics are out of court, they belong to metaphysic. God alone knows how many points go to form a given square, but their number is not infinite to Him (36). The word 'Infinite^ is used to denote

XIV INTRODUCTION.

all that goes beyond our power of conception, even though the thing be not infinite in itself. A number, therefore, which is infinite to one man will be fmite to another; and none is infmite to Divine IntelUgence. This evidently flows from WycHfs conception of maxima and minima. There is a fixed number of all things — even of the points in a Hne — which, infinite to us, is finite to God; and no straight line can be infinitely long (37, 38).

As this conception of the Infmite may give rise to the inquiry how far our author is in agreement with the majority of Scholastic philosophers, a short digression is not out of place here, and I shaU proceed briefiy to state the points on which there is the least contradic^ tion among Schoolmen in this matter.

The Infinite means 'that beyond which nothing greater can be conceived", whether by human thought, or by any other inteUigence, however perfect. If no substance or being can be conceived greater, it is the Absolute Infinite — God; if no accident, then it is the relative Infinite — of quantity (multitude or magnitude) or of quaHty. The Infi- nite cannot be made up of finite parts; it is not the raere negation, but the negation of a negation, and thus has a positive meaning. Infinite magnitude of matter is impossible; so is an infinite number, an infinite multitude, and a movement infinitely swift. Infinite imperfection or badness is also inadmissible; for it would totally destroy any substance in which it inhered; but quaHties that denote nothing but perfection, such as force, Hfe, duration, &c. must be admitted in God; in the human soul too, but only from a certain point of view, "^'secundum quid". This Infinite '^secundum quid" is in general predicated of that which is finite in every sense but one; as, e. g., the two halves of an infinite Hne, or of infinite space. In this sense, and from the point of view from which it is fmite, one infinite may be greater than another. — Clearly the term, as employed by WycHf, has quite another meaning, unless when he appHes if to God.

Objections based upon geometry. — If WycHPs theory be true, then the number of points is the same in two lines, one of which is double of the other. For two mobiles, passing over each of them, one double as fast as the other, correspondingly to the length of the Hnes, will go over them in the same number of instants, and therefore that same number of points wiU be passed in that time. The difficulty is solved

INTRODUCTION. XV

by denying that at each instant of any movement one point is passed over ; it is the case only for the swiftest movement possible, that of the 'equinoctial point' in the sky (38, 39). — It is true that such an answer does away with all really continuous motion, except for the said point: during any slower movement from A to B, the mobile C would be at rest in a multitude of points; and thus rest would be identical with movement. But movement may appear to be continuous, though it is not really so; a successton of very short motions, interspersed with rests, will give us the feehng of continuity. As a fact, our senses often mislead us; as, for instance, in certain phenomena of sight, and in the vibrations of which sound consists. If the most rapid possible movement is at the rate of one point per instant, it follows that the world cannot be larger than it is; for if larger, it would revolve more rapidly, and that is im- possible: a confirmation of what has been proved elsewhere and other- wise (39, 42). — "But if the apices of several pyramids tonched, they would be in the same place, and thus coincide." This is merely begging the question. If a point has position of its own, it cannot be in the same place with another. — It is said that in Wyclifs system each point musttouchan infmity of others; which leads to difficulties. But this is denied. Six points only touch a seventh placed in their midst. Thus in certain directions one cannot go immediately from one point to the next; their position follows certain fixed rules, somewhat like the grain in wood, or the lines of cleavage in crystals. A line drawn from one point to another which it cannot touch directly, only by means of a third, is nevertheless not bent; for it is as straight as a line can possibly be. To say, the point A touches B, and B, C; therefore, A touches C, is a sophism. AII this is indeed unimaginable; but we must go beyond imagination when we have to deal with the Inextended. And at any rate, Nominalists have no right to argue at all in the matter (42 — 46).

Here Wychf enters into a series of explanations on the different senses given to the words point, line, surface and angle, and he expounds what he conceives to be Euclid's meaning. An angle may mean either its apex, or the space which it encloses; two very different things (46 — 49). But the adversaries point out that either an angle is indefini- tely great; which Wyclif denies, affirming that any angle is complete in its apex (49, 50); or that any number of angles, small and great, may coexist at the same point; which is granted as a harmless

XVI INTRODUCTION.

conclusion (50, 51); and that our author's system would imply the denial, not only of Euclid's defmition of angles, but of the whole of his treatise on the subject. (Here, by the way, we may note how quietly the tri- section of an angle is taken for granted "secundum doctrinam prime Vitulonis", i. e. VitelHo, the famous Mediaeval mathematician and optician "que docet angulum rectum datum in tres partes dividere", whereas all mathematicians are at present agreed that such trisection is impossible. As, however, I have not been able to get a sight of ViteUio's works, though Hving in the very city in which he wrote them,^ I am not quite sure that what he teaches is anything more than a mere practical way of divid- ing an angle into three parts, without any claim to absolute exactitude.) WycHf repHes that, as regards EucHd's defmition of the angle — the meeting of two Hnes — this is merely a genetic, not an essential defmition. Euclid indeed says what causes an angle ; but that is not the angle itself. As to the rest, the answer is ready: EucHd's theory con- cerns only sensible angles, not such as are found amongst points which touch; such, for instance, as form triangles which have sides only two points long, and of which the apex is an angle which cannot be bisected^ &c. — AIl this cannot be imagined, and should, therefore, be denied from a merely geometrical point of view (52, 53).

We come now to what is perhaps the strongest mathematical ob- jection to Wyclifs system. According to him, points are placed as fol- lows, in a smail square of say, 25 points only; I have added the con- necting hyphens in the subjoined figure to show which points touch, and which do not touch. As is seen, the points on the diagonals do not touch directly, and there are no more points on the diagonal than on the side of a square. This, true for the given square, all but infinitesimally small, will also be true for all greater ones ; and thus the diagonal of any square (containing an equal number of points) will be equal to its side, the greater to the less: which is absurd (53, 54). — Wyclifs reply admits as an evident fact that the diagonal of a square is longer than its side. But when he comes to the statement that parallel Hnes,

' I asked for a copy of Vitellio's works at the Jagellonian Library, Cracow, but was informed that they had been lent to a gentleman who lived a good distance away.

I I

INTRODUCTION. XVII

drawn frorn the sides and perpendicularly to them, touch the diagonal at only one point, he denies it. If it were so, the diagonal would be only as long as the side. Each parallel intersects the diagonal at several points; and this accounts for the greater length of the latter Hne. It is absurd to suppose that two Hnes which intersect at a very acute angle do not touch by more points than when they are perpendicular; or that these paraHels would no longer be straight after intersection: the touching in several points does not change their direction. This somewhat risky answer is supported by the assertion that the ultimate squares (consisting of two points eacli) are beyond the scope of geometry; also by some remarks concerning the position of points relatively to the poles of the world (55, 56), which I, not clearly seeing their relevancy to the subject, prefer to pass over. But I think it is at this part of the book that we get nearest to the weak point in WycHfs system: viz. that two poirits which touch, i. e, which are at no distance from each other, are yet not in the same place. I at least can fmd, even in thought, no distinction between distance and difference of place.

WycHf comes to the conclusion that God alone knows what the; real proportion of the diagonal of a square to its side is; for it depends on the number of points touched by aH the intersecting lines paraHel to that side. Geometry may perhaps be true only hypotheticaHy ; it can prove that the proportion |/ 2 exists in the whole diagonal, but not that it exists in every part of that line (57). The admission that in every Hne there is a certain number of points, of course impHes the denial of aH incommensurable quantities; that is, absolutely incommensurable, though for us and to our way of thinking, they are so: for in every such case the numbers are infmite to us, and we cannot teH whether they are odd or even (58 — 60).

Another perplexing question concerns the shape of the smallest figures possible, which consist of a few points only. Are they circles, triangles, spheres, pyramids, or what? They may be maintained to be either any or none of these, and it does not matter, since they are unimaginable realities in their extreme smaHness. We cannot even con- ceive them distinctly by the inteHect, at least in its present state of union with matter (60 — 63).

ObJeciioHS based upon physical science. — Rarefaction (and con- densation too) would be impossible in such a system. For if the whole

B

XVIII INTRODUCTION.

of space were lilled with indivisible impenetrable atoms, should anything increase in size, the whole universe would become larger than it can possibly be. Yet rarefaction must be admitted; and a like argument has the same weight as regards condensation. Wyclif, in his reply, at once declares that he does not admit the possibility of a body occupying more or less space without gain or loss of matter. Rarefaction, there- fore, and condensation also, are denied in this sense, but admitted in another. On account of the accession or the removal of another body, a substance may seem to increase or diminish in size; as, v. g., smoke seems to spread itself out and fill a room, whereas it is in reality mixed with the air, This is the only sense in which rarefaction is possible, and it answers all the objections. We need not follow our author through the mazes of Mediaeval physics which he threads, nor inquire whether this view would destroy all difiference between the elements of fire, air, water and earth (63 — 70). Wyclif ends by stating, as his opinion, thal the compenetration of two bodies . is an utter impossibihty. This conclu- sion evidently flows from his doctrine. Two points, having no dimensional qualities — nothing but position — would, if they coincided, lose even that essential quality, and be nothing at all. But it raises grave theolo- gical difficulties; for the School generally admits that God's Omnipotence can make two bodies occupy the same space,

Objeclions drawn from theology. Since spiritual forms, having more perfect entity than matter, can occupy the same space with it, then a fortiori matter can be coextended with matter. Besides, the glorified bodies of the Saints possess the gift of subtlety, i. e. of passing through matter; which seems to imply compenetration. — The answer is a repeated denial of its possibility (71). The gift of subtlety, bestowed on glorified bodies, is somewhat perplexing; but there are various ways of ex- plaining it without admitting compenetration (72, 73).

Objections clrawn from chemical combination. — If every punctal atom is and remains eternally the same, then the elements would remain in their compounds; size would be made up of that which has no size, and movement of what is not properly movement, as one point passes instantaneously into the place of another. — The first of these con- clusions is granted by Wyclif, though the question itself was, during the whole of the Middle Ages, a battle-field for the rival sections of the School. The Thomists maintained that in all chemical combinations,

INTRODUCTION. XIX

as distinguished from mere mechanical mixtures, the elements do not exist any longer actually, but only potentially; that is, they may, under certain circumstances, again be extracted from the compound. Their position, as given in their text-books of Philosophy at the present day, is that in a mere mixture — • of hydrogen and oxygen, for example — both elements, though mingled together, do really and actually exist; but that as soon as the mixture is exploded they no longer exist in the compound — water — except in this sense, that the water may be analyzed into its constituents. Of course, so long as it is not possible to show them the atoms coexisting side by side, they are free to main- tain that their existence is only potential. But, even during the Middle Ages, the Scotists protested loudly against such an assumption, of which nothing could prove the truth.

WycHf takes the side of the Scotists, as he was bound by his system to do. He gives us a disquisition on the conditions necessary to chemical combination, which seem to be almost the same as those now posited by modern science (74); and then he observes that Aristotle's assertion of the non-existence qf the elements in a compound ought not to be taken hterally. Even Averrhoes' position, viz. that they exist, but with less intensity of being, would be contrary to the system of inextended points; compenetration being impossible, nothing can interfere with their intensity of existence (75). With yet greater decision he opposes the hypothesis of merely potential existence. If the reason that there is a form which unites the elements in one compound (making the elemental forms to exist no longer) were valid, then in a human body, of which the soul is the form, nothing would remain of the body but its primal matter; and that body, so complicated in all its parts, would be simpler than an element (76). It may be worthy of remark that this conclusion, strange as it may seem, is even now admitted and taught by that branch of Neo-Scholasticism which adheres strictly to the teaching of St. Thomas. When the human form, or soul, departs, what (they are asked) takes place in the body? Do not all the elements exist in it again? And if they exist there at once with all their differences, can it be that they were only potentially there before? The answer given is that after the sou^s departure, a new, but transient form comes to give being to the body; it is called the cadaveric form, fornta cadaverica, and precedes the various forms of decomposing matter, which succeed

B*

XX INTRODUCTION.

each other until the final evolution of the elements. AU this time the elements were in potentia — remotissima, remota, proxima; then in actti primo remoto, in actu primo proximo, and at last in actu secundo.

WycHf continues to urge the point against his adversaries. If we get the elements out of the compound^ they must have been there before; and many instances go to prove that they actually exist there; for instance, the phosphorescence of fishes' scales in the dark is attributable to the actual existence of fire (77). And as a fact, we find in combina- tions the same quaHties as were before in the elements; or if not, a mean between them ; or their reaction in the compound may even pro- duce a quaHty. There is no need to suppose that the former quaHties are destroyed because they do not appear (78, 79). I have added the last clause as the answer of such philosophers as dispute with the modern Thomists, who point out that carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen are harmless, and that prussic acid is a violent poison. The poisonous (juaHty is merely the reaction upon each other of various quaHties of the three component elements,

To this the adversaries reply that such a compound would be but a mere aggregate of atoms Vhich a man that had the lynx's eyes might see separate'. WycHfs answer is that of the modern chemical school; th-ey are not mere aggregates: what differenliates the compound is ihe relative position of onc atom io anotJier (SO). But, it is urged, if the elemental forms are everywhere in the compound, the superadded form of the compound must be novvhere. Wyclif repHes that this form is every- where in the whole, and to a certain extent, indivisibly so, being less material than the elementary forms. There is something of the universal in these higher forms, which exist partiaHy in each atom, considered as part of the compound (80 — 81). — One last difficuky. In this system, tlie whole world is one being; and one only, since all points touch, from the centre to the extreme point where space ceases to be possible. — It is quite true, ansvvers WycHf, that the world is one being; but it does not foUow that everything in the world is one. One being may be separated from another by a third. Continuity does not mean sameness of nature. Every part of the world joins in and aids the harmonious action of the whole; all things are made for man^ and it is for that reason that all the elements concur to form his organs of sense, and

INTRODUCTION. XXI

that some of them predominate in certain of the elements, and others in certain others (82 — 85).

Whal is tlie measure of velocily of motioii? — Not, says Wyclif, the space gone over by the mobile in a given time. This seems para- doxical; but an examp^le, given directly afterwards, shows that our author is thinking, not of the distance in length, but of the whole surface gone over. A large body and a small one, though moving with equal speed, will go through very unequal spaces in the same time. What measures the motion of any body is the point of maximum swiftness, which in every case must exist, and must exist somewhere at the surface of the moving body; there is also a point where the movement is reduced to a minimum, but Wyclif, somewhat unaccountably, restricts this proposition to living beings that move (86). Now the measure of velocity of a body is the Hne described by the point which moves fastest (87, 94).

General arguments against Wyclifs position. — The First Mobile, being the outermost sphere, and having no space beyond it, can describe no Hne at all; planets have many movements, and no point can be said to describe them all at the same time. Again, if we suppose a given length passed over in a given time, this may be done by mobiles of infinitely varying velocities, which would aU have this length and time for the measure of their respective velocities. And we can con- ceive the case of a body continually losing its swiftest point by the very fact of its movement: which would refute the assertion that every mobile must have such a point (87, 88). This last objection is urged, from p. 89 to p. 92, in a long argument which I have been utterly unable to foUow. Wyclif then points out that the reason for which some deny the general idea of movement (abstracting from its rapidity, and allowing a general measure of velocity for the whole mobile) is in reaHty the doctrine of Nominalism. NominaHsts do not want to admit a universal idea of movement which exists even in bodies at rest, when acted upon by contrary forces (94). The movement of a body is as swift as that of its swiftest part; this swiftness is the measure of the whole {ib.). As to the objections, that of the First Mobile has no value whatever. What that sphere describes may not be formally called a line, but it is equi- valent to a Hne. Planets have not many movements, but one which is tantamount to many (unus motus, habens racionem diversorum motuum) (95). If, in the last case, the point of greatest velocity is continually lost, a new

XXII INTRODUCTJON.

one is continually brought into being; take the velocity common to each of these at each instant, and you get the speed of the whole (96).

Here comes a curious passage, in which WycHf is led to state the exact rapidity of the swiftest movement possible, viz. one point per instant. It seems to us that, in continuous movement, whether slow or quick, one point — an infmitely small distance — is always passed over in the infinitely small interval of one instant. This is denied. In all move- ments which are slower than that of the Equator of the First Mobile, we have two, three, four .... instants during which the point is motionless, and then passes instantaneously on to the next place, which is infinitely near (97 — 99). In all these remarks, and elsewhere, as the reader will doubtless perceive, there is a dim perception of the non- equality of infinitesimal quantities; but the state of Mathematics was not then sufficiently advanced to foster the idea, and Wyclif himself, though far in advance of his time, was more of a metaphysician than of a mathematician. His conception, if carried into the field of pure Mathe- matics, might possibly have had good results; understood in the Realistic sense, they came to nothing.

A logical quibble about the possibility of instantaneous change (whether, between the instant of changing and that of having changed, there is any interval) brings our author to a short digression upon death, which takes place in two instants. In the first, the man dies; in the second, he is dead; for we cannot say, he is dead at the instant when he dies, nor Jie dies at the instant when he is dead. Other writers would say that the instant of death is the same in both cases; but viewed from different standpoints : as the end of life, and the beginning of non-Iife. This, Wyclif says, is impossible (100).

Astronomical objections. — The assertion that the Equator alone moves one point per instant is beset with many difficulties. The First Mobile is a perfect sphere; its movements therefore ought at all points, and not only at the Equator, to be uniform. But every point in the First Mobile does not touch every other: so the smaller circles, making a shorter journey in the same time, will not require to move so fast. The circle tangent to the Equator has but one point fewer than the Equator; performing its journey in the same time, it will remain immobile for one instant, to make up for the missing point: which of the points is missing we need not enquire, — The Poles belong to the great circles,

INTRODUCTION. XXIII

perpendicular to the Equator, i. e. those of which the curvature is the smallest; at the same time each of them forms the smallest possible of circles — a point — parallel to the Equator, and of which the curva- ture is the largest. Which of these curvatures belongs to that punctal atom which is a pole of the world? WycHf, noticing that the difficulty would tell against his adversaries no less than against himself, solves it by denying that any one circle is more curved than another; in each circle every point of the circumference is equally distant from the centre. — If the Equator consist of tripunctal atoms, it cannot be a circle. For these atoms do not form a curve; they are either in Hne or make up a triangle; in either case, there is curvity. WycHf answers that, being points which touch each other without any distance between them, they form neither a triangle nor a straight Hne. Geometry is only seemingly against this, because such things are conceivable by the mind alone, not by imagination. That science cannot give us absolute exacti- tude (loo — 1 1 1).

Of Augmintation. — Leaving the questions concerning local move- ment, and coming to the movement by which, without changing its place, a body increases in volume, WycHf points out that augmentation, strictly taken, means only the increase of an animated being, caused by nutrition and by the assimilation of food (iil), gives us a description of the digestive process such as might be expected, interesting merely as a curiosity (ii2, 113), and enters into a disquisition about the cause of natural death from mere decrease of vitaHty (114, 115). The movement of augmentation is not continuous any more than undulations are con- tinuous; it is a coUective entity, consisting of many movements (115, 116). The difficulties which foUow are of sHght moment, and only serve to briog in a description of the various kinds of tissue in the human body. The rapidity of augmentation depends on the size acquired and the time taken to acquire it (116 — 118).

Of AUeration. As alteration is a change in quality, grounded upon the substantial components of each body — matter and form, — it is mainly WycHfs theory with respect to the latter that is discussed here. Having expounded his idea of the universe — one material being, made up of punctal atoms, fiUing aU possible space, and unchangeable except in so far as one of its parts can be separated from another by local movement — he states that the world can be thought, ftrstly, as mere

XXIV INTRODUCTION.

being; secondly, as substance, or the subject of various attributes; and tkirdly, as matter, being extended, and possessing form (119). Thus matter, form, and the compound are the same being, the same essence, and not separate reaHties (120). This, in fact though not in words, is the denial of matter and form in the usual Scholastic sense of "two distinct realities, whereof the latter determines the former and the former is determinable by the latter which at the same time is sustained in existence by the former: both incomplete in themselves and apart, but together making up the complete material substance". In WycUfs system, there is no need to admit such dualism. The simple inextended point may be either fire, air, water, or earth; this possibility is matter. It is actually one or other of the four; the igneity, aeriality, &c., which it possesses is its form. And the point itself, as being thus whilst able to be other- wise, is the compound. Denying the existence of extended atoms, the writer, whose system here does not dififer much from that of other Atomists {i. e. so far as his way of explaining matter and form goes), escapes from many difficulties which beset the path of those who admit that the primordial atom is extended. But there are others.

Objcctions. — It is asserted that matter and form, since they are parts of the whole compound; cannot be identical with the whole. But Wyclif notes that they are not quantitative parts — as, for example, the head and the heart in man — but qualitative merely, like rationahty and animality, for instance. The whole man is reasonable and is animal; the whole man is not at once head and heart (121). We have thus a sort of trinity in which matter, form and compound, identical in one sense^ are dififerent in another: but Wyclif takes great care to point out the difference between this trinity and that of the soul, or of God (121, 122). — If matter, as WycHf asserts (121) is eternal, form is so too, being identical with it; and thus the world is eternal. But here he denies that the radical identity of matter, form, and compound with Being, renders these three identical with each other. Man is reasonable, man is animal; yet rationaHty and animaHty differ. AU that is true, is good; yet truth is not the same thing as goodness. And WycUf points to the Incarnation, as affording us another instance of a similar faUac}' (123). — On the supposition that every essence is in reaUty everywhere the same, we have aU sorts of contradictions. The answer to this is that contra- dictions may coexist in the same subject, either at different times, or

INTRODUCTION. XXV

in different parts. No quality is essentially inherent to primordial matter; therefore, nothing can contradict it. A body composed of parts which come and go successively may receive different and contrary qualities, and yet remain the same; as, v, g"., the Mediterranean may ebb and flovi^, and yet be the same sea (124 — 127). Thus, when we say, This is hot, we speak of the compound alone; it is that which is hot. Here comes a digression. How can heat, the proper quality of fire, be found in water, which is naturally cold? Particles of fire may be mingled with the water, though they are in a violent state; the water, if left to itself, will soon again become cold. However mingled the different elements may be, they stili obey the laws which govern their nature (128 — 130). The chapter closes with a short survey of creation, beginning with the elements which, uniting, form vapours; these produce metals and earths; the earths, if mingled with fire and water, bring forth plants and also animals in an ascending scale of forms, the lower hardly distinguishable from inanimate beiugs, the highest, quasi-immaterial. The soul of man is completely so ; and each higher form includes in its perfection that of the lower ones (130 — 132).

b) Ghapter X.

Summary of the Contents.

Temporal Propositions do not afftrm that the known is wherever the knower exists (133, 134). — Objections refnted (134 — 155). — Are all things together in time and place? Arguments contra (155 — 157J. — Wyclifs solution [157 — 161). — Coroltaries (161 — 165). — Three views on the essence of Time ; P'^^ that it is identical with God or the world (165 — 166); 2"'-^ that nothing temporal is in the present (166 — 170); 3'''^ that Time might be indeftnitely lengthened by God (170 — 173). — WycliJ's vievv: Is extends to all past and future time (173 — 177). — Objections refuted (177 — 191). — An eternal antecedent does not neces- sarily produce its conseqiient in time [191 — 192). — A cause produces its effect before that effect exists (192 — 199). — Time is the same everywhere. Arguments contra refuted (199 — 211). — Movement implies time; refutation of objections (211 — 224). — The non-entity oj the world did not precede its entity (224 -227).

XXVI INTRODUGTION.

Is the known wherever its knower is? — No; for then everything would be, as God is, everywhere (133, 134). It is objected that every- thing is truth, and that truth, like God, is everywhere. We may, how- ever, admit this, restricting the sense of being in space to ftlling that space quantitatively. Thus, granting the force of the argument, we nevertheless deny it in the signification usually given to words. Christ's Body has size in the Sacrament, yet it does not properly fill space; it is present without either position or shape. The bread is not annihilated; what remains is a purely mathematical body, but not nothing ; the sacramental sign is the reality of Christ's Body (134 — 137). It may be urged that the fact of movement is not extended in space, and that movement is consequently everywhere. But local movement is the movement of a body, and must be extended with that to which it belongs. Virtues, again, exist throughout the whole man, body and soul; but they are nowhere else but where their subject is. When a part moves, the whole may be said to move, it is true; only in a different way (139, 140). Movement thus takes its determination (individuacionem suam) either from its subject alone, qua subject, or from the subject with all its integral parts, or from this with the velocity also taken into account. The third point of view implies the first and the second; but not vice versa. Wherever there is a more in- dividual movement, there is also a more universal one; and in this sense, movement as a universal, is everywhere, according to Aristotle (140, 141). God indeed is all truth everywhere; yet truth, as created, is not identical with God, and it were a fallacy to draw such an inference. The sense of words in these questions depends much on their position in the sentence. "It is now possible for a given future instant to exist", and, "It is possible for a given future instant to exist now", are two widely different propositions. God's knowledge of everything is absolutely boundless. No time exists for Him, He is means He is yesterday, or He was to-niorrow ; existing at once in all eternity — an instant to Him, — He comprises all duration in His being (141 — 143); and therefore His existence is an eternal Notv. — Again, we have a similar sophism: "That may necessarily be which cannot be necessarily." This is false, but only when understood of absolute, not of hypothetical necessity, A future instant is necessarily "about to be", at a time when it cannot possibly be "about to be". AU this is mere foolish subtlety; we go no farther than to say that, if at any moment it is true that a given being

INTRODUCTION. XXVII

will exist, the being is in the future (143 — 145)' At different times that which is white is black, a man differs from himself, &c. ; but this impHes no absurdity. Becoming is a change, not of the subject, but of its ■suchness.' An instantaneous change does not imply an infinitely swift movement, for the idea of swiftness implies that of time, not of one instant only (145 — 147).

A great many fallacies are brought forward against this position,

such as that, v. g., if future whiteness be always predicable of an indi-

vidual, that individual will always be white; so that if at any time he

were black, he would have and not have two essential contradictory

qualities; or that a king cannot have been baptized, if, when baptized,

he was not yet a king; and so on ad infinitum. They all belong to the

class of fallaciae accidentis. "What you have bought, you have eaten ;

but you have bought raw meat; therefore you have eaten raw meat."

The change from black to white is one, not of nature, but of quahty.

The individual differs from himself modally, not essentially. The 'being a

king' is in a man a mere accidental quality; the king has been baptized,

not as a king, but as a man. "He who is now a king, was baptized

when not a king", is perfectly true. Much depends on the compound

or the divided sense in which terms may be taken. "He who is begotten

is David the king; David the king and who is begotten belong, as pre-

dicates, to the verb is, in the divided, not in the compound sense.

Besides, the act of begetting is not instantaneous ; it has many pre-

paratory acts (147 — 154)« — There are also several theological argu-

ments on p. 150, concerning the possibility of God's assuming the per-

sonaHty of aU creatures, which WycHf briefly meets by denying (154,

155) in direct opposition to Aquinas (Sum. Th. p. 3^ qu. III. art. 5, 6).

Are all things together, both in time and place? — WycHf first

of all gives the arguments contra. If it were so, there would no longer

be any distance between things. The future and the past would exist

eternaUy; a man would both exist and not exist in the same (eternal)

time. Again, whatever takes place in any part of space and time, must

take place there only and only then; its existence cannot possibly be

extended any farther (155). On the other hand, the world is everywhere;

yet the whole world is not in any part of space; and in Hke manner,

if anything exists at any time, its then existence is true in aU time; and

so also of space (156). — WycHf thinks that this question arises mainly

XXVIII INTRODUGTION.

from the varying senses of the word together. Two things may be said to be together, i. e. both occupying exactly the same space (an abso- lute impossibility) or contiguous, each being in different places, or both, though separate, being contained in the same larger space. As to time, absohite simultaneity is possible (157). This answers most of the objec- tions. Ahvays may be understood as meaning eternity, or during all eternity, or in some part of all eternity. The last sense is of course widely different from the others, and in this sense alone, whatever is future or past is always (158). We may see a thing, though we do not see the whole thing; just so, a man may exist in the X^'^ century, though non-existent during a part of the X"^ century (158, 159). To maintain this, however, we must say that time consists of instantaneous elements. For, if instants are not parts of time, then instantaneous events (such as cognition, division, &c.) could not be said to exist at any time, having no duration. And if not at any time, their contradictories would be true in all time, notwithstanding that they also would be true. It cannot be said that, from non-cognition to cognition, there is a change which im- pliestime; for from one contradictory to another, there is no real change. That which is not white now, if at any time it is to become white, cannot receive the predicate of mere non-whiteness: so non-existence in a part of time is not non-existence in that time. After death, a man is neither simply non-existent nor existent: he is non-existent then (160, 161).

Corollaries. — Time, the duration of the world, began with the world, and with it must last eternally; necessary to the creation of the world, it does not depend on anything but the general fact of move- ment. It consists of indivisible instants as its elements; these are abso- lutely without magnitude, and time itself is everywhere, indivisibly the same throughout the universe (162). As the world is everywhere, so is time, and so is God (163), What begins and ends in time (as cor- ruptible entities) ; what makes up the very essence of time (as an instant); what has modes of being measured by time (as the heavens), may be called temporal, but in different senses (163, 164). Time is in itself a cause of dissolution, for it causes things to grow older; but occasionaliy it is a cause of production, since it renders their production possible. Its very essence is change, and no two of its parts can coexist (164, 165).

Three views on the essence of Tinte. — a) It is identical with God or the wc)rld's existence. This view is absurdly erroneous; it would

LNTRODUCTION. XXIX

make all things eternal, and destroy all certitude as to the duration of things (165, 166).

b) Nothing is, but everything either was or will be. This cuts short disputes as to the existence of things during an infinitely brief interval. But then, what never is, never was or will be. To God's knowledge nothing is in the future, so He would know, for instance, movement to exist, and it would not be true. One hour must be the double of half an hour; if so, there must come an instant at which this is true in the present: i, e. when half is past, half future, and the whole hour partly one and pardy the other. Present may indeed be taken in a wider sense than one single instant. Here Wyclif shows clearly that, in the same way as he assumes the existence of separate individual points as reahties, so he also assumes the real existence of instants, joined together to form time, shorter or longer, but also realiy existing in another time which includes both past and future. Instead, therefore, of a century being a present which is fictitious, consisting only of indivisible instants before and after each of which there is the non- existing past and the not yet existent future, the whole century forms a real present, though real in another sense than that of the instant which is now. And Wyclif adds that, if this be not admitted, he does not see how the sacramental words, for instance, "Hoc est corpus meum", can be true. Only an infinitesimal part of the proposition would exist; the whole, never; and consequently it never would be true. To say, "Nothing that is past or future exists", is in reality to destroy time. God's immut- able knowledge of things, and His free-will, are both contrary to such a supposition. Christ, in the Divine Essence of the Word, saw men long before their temporal existence; but He saw them as existing, and they did truly exist in the reality of long centuries of the future. And thus He is righdy called, Son of David, Son of Abraham, in this real exten- sion of time, by which David and Abraham come to be coexistent with Him. Has a posthumous child no father at all? None, unless we grant the real simultaneity of its existence now with the past in which its father lived (166 — 170).

c) Time, though a successive quantity, can be lengthened out inde- finitely by Almighty Power, so that one instant would be equal to ages. This is possibly the doctrine of the aevum or instans angelicitm, famihar to Mediaeval Schoolmen, which some of them may haye supposed

XXX INTRODUCTION.

extensible to corporeal beings. According to that doctrine, the duration of Angels, from one thought to another, may last for centuries without change — centuries that are for them but one indivisible instant. This is generally allowed, and I have not anywhere been able to find any trace of the actual extension of the doctrine to bodily substances. But it may be explained as foUows: Supposing that, at the present moment, God suspended every movement in the whole universe for a hundred years — like the tale of the Sleeping Beauty on a gigantic scale — and then allowed it to continue as before, there would be no movement, and therefore no succession of time; and one instant would be a hun- dred years in length. This is in flat contradiction to Wyclifs doctrine of eternal time, consisting of instants, each of which requires another immediately following it; so he is at some pains to refute the possibility of such a hypothesis. The instant is an individual quantity, which can neither be lessened nor increased. 14" it could, it would contain many instants, and thus be no longer one only. A short time would equal a long one; the essence of time would no longer consist in duration alone, for nothing could differentiate the loo-century instant from an ordinary one. In conclusion, Wyclif dismisses this theory with contempt (170 — 173).

WycJifs view. Is extends itself really to all time, past and future. Whatever is, is always, as has been shown. If not, we deny the very essence of time. Its parts do not coexist, but vanish as fast as they appear; yet they are; now in the past, now in the future: and again, in a wider present they may be said to coexist. This is clearly signified by the sense of the verb Is, which by itself does not connote any given instant of time, and therefore signifies eternity (173 — 177).

Objections refttted. — To say that all instants, because they are together in eternal time, are together with absolute simultaneity, is but a sophism. Simultaneity requires that two things be together at the same instant or instants, and at no others. Now one instant cannot exist exactly when another does, but either before or after (177 — 179). — The often urged 'necessity of all things' may be admitted, if understood as merely conditional upon God's will; for whatever is determinately true, is neces- sarily true, and there is no such thing as indeterminate truth. Hypo- thetical necessity, as this is, does not deny contingency, nor the free-will of man, nor chance. The hypothetical fact that God foreknows anything, makes it necessarily exist at some tjme or other, Given that I exist, it

INTRODUCTION. XXXI

is not in God's power that I do not exist. But when must anything exist? At a moment known to God (179 — 183). The simultaneity of life and death would, as already stated, require them both to take place at the very same instant. Time exists, but its parts do not all exist now, only one at a time, Now is but one mode of an existence which not now does not destroy. An instant then, now, and to come exists dif- ferently, but cannot at any time be called simply non-existent. Antichrist must come: therefore he has come . . . in the future. That is a modal, but a real existence. It was never true that / am not. To exist and not to exist are contradictories ; they may be true of the same being, but not in the same Now. God knows past, present and future things with the very same knowledge, yet this does not argue sameness in the object known. Light is not affected by the presence or the absence of the object illuminated. God may know present and future things as past, if they exist in time; things eternal are eternally present; such, for example, as the archetypes of what was, is, or is to be (183 — 188). Here Wyclif again returns to his adversaries' favourite argument, viz. that black is white, and all contraries identical. But one remark of his is worth noticing. A proposition may be true, and yet false at any fmite part of time; as, for instance: 'All the instants of time exist'. This is true only for and in endless time (188 — 191).

An eternal antecedent does not necessarily catise its conseqttent in time. — If it did, all things would be eternal. God eternally knows and causes all that which exists temporally. The extrinsic act of God, termin- ated in the creature, is, as thus terminated, neither eternal nor neces- sary; the intrinsic act of His being is eternal and changeless (191, 192).

A catise prodiices its effect hefore that effect exists. That is, before its existence it is producing it, but not now; in the future. The ideal being of the effect depends upon its cause, and is produced by it before the moment when its real existence has to be actuated. On the other hand, cause, qua cause, and effect, are simultaneous. Many things are neither instantaneous nor temporal; v. g., certain eternal truths, and beings of which the existence is intermittent. WycHf here wonders how the writers of his time can oppose his system, which is confirmed by the very expressions they employ; and he blesses God, who has enHghtened him that he may escape the difficulties in which they are entangled (192—195). — The necessity of sin depends on our own free-will; the

XXXII INTRODUCTION.

fact of its happening, on the will of God, — The use of the present for the past and the future cannot be blamed as an abuse of terms, nor as the denial of expositorial syllogisms. No logician should use it thus when he is Hkely to be misunderstood through ignorance; but it is allowed to speak otherwise to philosophers than to the common people. Neither the expositorial syllogism, nor any other, is denied by Wyclifs theory, which on the contrary admits many forms of syllogism that others deny. — A curious difficulty is raised here by the adversaries (195). Wyclif is certain that he has had no son. Yet perhaps his son is wiser than he; for he possibly may have a son yet. If ihis son 'will be', then 'he is' according to the theory which extends the future to the present. Wyclif denies this conclusion, unless it is certain that he will have a son. At first sight it does not clearly appear how this can be denied in the form given. "FiHus meus ex mihi dubio esset sapiencior me." A supposition that depends upon another supposition is quite thinkable. But we must here remember WycHfs doctrine — that the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic possibiHty has no real foundation; that a seemingly possible creature is in reaHty impossible, if God has chosen never to create it {See Logica vol. II., Intr. XXIV). We have the right to deny the possibiHty of WycHfs ever having a son in the future, unless we are certain that he wiH have one. Perhaps the individual in question is possible; God knows; but we know nothing at aU about him (195—199).

Time is the same everywhere. — Our author begins by enumerating the arguments contrary to his own opinion (199 — 202), and then refutes them one by one. Even if the world were not everywhere;, it would not foUow that time is not everywhere. But as a fact, the world being (partiaHy) in each and all of its parts, that argument must faH to the ground (202). — It is denied that the world has any unity whatever, being a mere aggregate; and time, an accident belonging to the world, cannot have more unity than its subject. But WycHf points out that the laws of nature give unity to this aggregate, just as poHtical laws give unity to an aggregate or assembly of men. Besides, the world, not- withstanding changes, remains the same in its efficient cause — God — and also in its material cause — the atoms of which it consists. If we grant that the world is animated, its unity becomes much more evident; now, we have many proofs that it reaUy is an animated

INTRODUCTION. XXXII [

being (202, 204). — If a part of the world could become the whole, then indeed the duration of each part would have separate existence. But this supposition would be true only in case a part of the world were annihilated; a possibiUty which WycHf absolutelj- denies (204, 205). — What is extended is not everywhere the same, True. But is time extended, merely because it is the duration of a body? No, A man's duration does not change, if he happen to lose some part of his body. Movement indeed, though inextended in itself, is extended in the body which moves. But take away any part of a body in motion, and the whole quantity of the movement is lessened ; the same cannot be said of its duration. Thus we may define Time as the universal, indivisible and ubiquitous duration of all temporal things (205, 206).

Another objection, on which (to judge from the length at which it is dealt with) WycHfs opponents seemed to rely a great deal, may be summed up as follows: Were time everywhere the same, day would be night, summer, winter; fair and foul weather would be identical: for they are parts of time. If WycHf answers that the same time may be night in one place and day in another, he is met by the reply: How then can time be the same in every place? Where there is night, there is no da)". If time, which is everywhere, be night, then night is everywhere; or if not, the universals Day and Night have a semi- spherical shape, and pursue each other round the earth ! A body moving swiftly westward would enjoy a longer day, and night, being everywhere where day is not, would exist in the interior of every opaque body. AII which is manifestly absurd (200, 20l). — The answer is obviously that day and night are not time, but times. Time happens to be called day or night according to the circumstance of the presence or the absence of light (206, 207). Time, i. e. that which is here as day, may be (and is) elsewhere as night. To say that Hght pursues darkness is a mere metaphor which may be admitted or denied as we choose. That night is semi-spherical, because it occupies a semi-spherical space, is not more true than that God is round, because He fills the rotundity of the universe. We ought also to draw a distinction between natural and artificial night and day. Uay exists eternally throughout the whole world, except in the interior of the earth, or in its shadow. Night is nearer and nearer to a fixed point on the earth's surface; it does

C

XXXIV INTRODUGTION.

not foUow that night moves, but that the movement of something else (i. e. of the sun) causes night to be nearer. Many quibbles arise from too lax a use of vv^ords. We have day after sunset; an edipse may cause night at noon, it being caused by the moon's shadow, not the earth's; and the moon, if self-luminous, would be the cause of day. Every kind of obscurity may be called night. AU these difficuhies spring from different meanings given to the same words. Properly, day exists on earth only when the sun is above a given horizon. But this is merely incidental, and quite irrelevant to what time is in itself (207 — 211).

Time impUes movement: objections refiited. — Time requires the idea of a Before and an Afterwards, which are to be found only in movement. If all movement were to cease, time would cease too. It is objected that the mere act of imagining time, without any movement, would suffice to cause time. Imagination would certainly create time by the very fact of its activity; but this is itself a movement, and the hypo- thesis of a bodily faculty working without motion is utterly absurd (211 — 215). At this juncture, WycHf enters into a digression respecting the happiness of the Blessed in Heaven (215, 216) and the misery of the damned (217), which is relevant to the question in so far as, po- siting eternal time, WycUf must posit eternal movement of some kind. He asserts that all movement cannot cease in the world; successive know- ledge, and (I may add) the feeHngs of pleasure and of pain, require it (217). Whether the world will continue to move after the Day of Judg- ment is not so certain. The changelessness which follows upon the attainment of the end of any being, may be called rest, and such rest is not opposed to successive motion. But the rest of a being that can and does not move must be denied for many reasons, one of which is that, applied to the world, such rest would neither be successive nor instan- taneous; neither in fime nor in any part of time. Lines, &c., may begin and end instantaneously ; but this cannot prove that a substance may do so too.

If it be true that the hand of a clock, turning round in exactly 24 hours, would measure time as well as the First Mobile, we have a very slow movement equal to one excedingly swift, as regards time; therefore movement and time are not interdependent. — This objection, Wyclif admits, contains a point which the imagination is unable to

INTRODUCTION. XXXV

represent. What is necessary is that the movement by which time is measured should be regular. Our author here gives some rather intricate explanations as to the possibiHty of a first instant of time, in answer to the objection that, at the first instant, there is either movement or rest; if rest, then no time exists ; if movement, that impHes a Before, and there is no first instant. The objection might easily be answered by saying that the first instant is not properly a part of time, but merely a terminus a quo, a starting-point: only such an answer would contradict the whole of WycHfs theory. — A last difficulty, viz. that the world, immediately after its creation, might have remained at rest for some time, is met by a flat denial. Rest is a perfection, but not such as can belong to the world. That it will exist eternally is no contradiction to the asser- tion that it began to exist; but here there is a very considerable diffi- culty (non occurrit michi promptus modus explanandi me in ista materia . . . ideo transeo pro presenti, p. 224). Evidently Wyclifs system, positing the necessity of the world's everlasting existence, because each instant of time requires one that foUows, is endangered by the question whether each instant does not require one to precede it: the old objection of Aristotle, who for that reason asserted the eternity of matter, an assertion contrary to faith.

Whether the non-being of the world preceded its being. — This last question arises out of the foregoing one, and seems (though that would contradict other parts of the system) to lead our author to a conclusion like that of Aristotle. For if it be answered negatively by the assertion (225) that the worId's non-being never was, and that its being was always, this looks a great deal like the doctrine of the eternity of matter. But in the answers to the objections, we find that Wyclif distinguishes between to be and to be existing. As / am long ages before / exist (according to him) so the ideal (though real) being of the world was etemally before its material existence; being before, it was without its existence, but not with its non-existence. Of course it is very hard to get out of the difficulty, which is on a par with the rest of the system; but the answer satisfies Wyclifs doubts. Ideal being, that which is the existing world, really was in eternity before the world existed. It was identical with God's knowledge, so long as God did not know the world to exist now, i. e. in the first moment of time.

C*

XXXVI INTRODUGTION.

IV. Conclusion: Th.e gist of the Nominalistic controversy.

With these arguments the third volume of Logica closes somewhat abruptly. Like the rest of the work, it abounds with arguments of striking force, as directed against NominaHstic exaggerations; but, on the other hand, Wyclifs theory of Space and Time Hes open to a great number of objections which even his ingenuity is not always able to refute as satisfactorily as might be desired, In many parts, for modern readers at least, it has only the interest of an intricate puzzle.

The problem of the Universals, however, though seemingly as dead as any other philosophical question of the past, deserves a few con- cluding words. I shall endeavour to show that, under other terms, and until some fuller explanation is found than has yet been given, it is and will remain for ever the great stumbHng-block in the path of all meta- physical inquirers.

When we have the idea of a man, an animal, a substance, we conceive something that is universaUy the same in aU men, animals, and substances. Is there anything in the objects of our thoughts that corre- sponds to it — anything reaUy universal, universale in re — or is there nothing? If we answer in the negative, we hold the NominaHstic position; if in the affirmative, we are ReaHsts in the old sense of the word.

But to answer affirmatively, we must, either impHcitly or expHcitly, lay down the foUowing formula: What is in our mind exists in itself in the same way as it is in our mind. Lay this down, and you have Berkeley's denial of matter, German transcendentaUsm, and modern IdeaHsm in general. Esse est percipi; to be is to be perceived. Matter exists as we know it, and as much as we know it; outside of the knower, it has no being at aU. The Non-Ego is posited by the Ego, and is identical with it. We can have cognizance of the external world only as a modification of ourselves; and if it exist as we know it, it is nothing but this modification.

On the other hand, Locke's conceptuaHsm, the materiaHsm of cer- tain XVIII'*' century philosophers, and the empiricism and positivism of our own times, proceed from the negation of this axiom. Locke, in order to affirm the Hmits of the human understanding, was obHged to deny to certain ideas any value but such as is merely subjective; which amounts

INTRODUCTION. XXXVIl

to saying that, however infallible the deductive process, however evident the first principles from which we start, we are still Hable to be mistaken, because things may be otherwise than as we kiiow them to be, To assert that all is matter, and that even the acts of our mind are material, notwithstanding our conscious certitude that there is an abyss between the two, is to set down that whatever we know, no matter how indu- bitably, may be false if it goes beyond material facts, and laws relative to matter. Again, the statement (which would ruin Metaphysic, if Meta- physic could be ruined by man) that at the bottom of all our inquiries into first principles, we find self-contradictions and absurdities in every possible assertion on either side; and that consequently though we can know neither space nor time, we must confine our investigations to that which is conditioned by time and space: — this well-known doctrine is based upon the denial that things are as we know them,

The quarrel between Realists and Nominalists is thus an important phase, but only a phase, of the everlasting struggle between two op- posite currents of thought. I call it everlasting, for though the forms may vary, it is likely to spring up for ever, or at least so long as human curiosity as regards such high and abstruse matters continues to exist,

Not that there is no answer to the problem, no middle way between the absolute affirmative of one class of philosophical thinkers, and the uncompromising negative of the other class. But in this very answer we find the reason why it is not universally accepted as settHng the point in dispute.

Do all things exist as they are known by us? As is a very short word, and (it would seem on a superficial view) not equivocal in the least. But let us consider it more closely. Things seen in a looking- glass both are and are not as they are in reaUty. There is a certain resemblance, more or less perfect; but the difference between them is that between the image and the original. In the same way, so far as any comparison is possible, the human intellect is the mirror of Nature. Our thoughts are the images of things; but we can no more conclude that things are of the nature of our thoughts than we can infer that a nosegay out of a looking-glass is of quicksilver amalgam, because tn the looking-glass it is imprinted upon quicksilver. Thus, things exist as they are known by us: that is, we have the right, they being the causes of our thoughts, to make certain inferences

XXXVIII INTRODUCTION.

from the effects to their causes; inferences necessarily vague and indeterminate to a great extent, but none the less true, on account of the necessary resemblance between the image and that which it images. Even a shadow, however distorted and indeterminate, bears some resemblance to the person who casts the shadow. But on the other hand, things do not exist as they are know by us, if as means a complete identity of nature between the known and the knowledge thereof. For fhat which is the known, is such only from one point of view, or at best only from a few points: it — i. e. the same that which (^as WycHf would say) — is the Unknown from millions of other points of view. AU the sophisms in the world cannot get the better of this distinction, by which all simiHtude of nattire between knowledge and the known is excluded, whilst simiHtude of representation is carefuHy maintained. But it is precisely this answer, though given by many great minds, both amongst the ancients and the moderns, that fails to satisfy by its very moderation. We long to get behind the 'Thing-in-itselP, and if we fmd we cannot, we cry out that there is nothing at all outside the mirror; or, after many a squabble, weary of disputes, we deny that we can know anything of that which the images represent, and that all science ought to be concerned with the images alone and their relations with each other. And thus the disappointment caused by the perfectly natural and simple answer given above leads to two contrary excesses of thought. Some, yearning towards the Absolute, conceive endless systems by which to go beyond the limitations of the mirror: systems beforehand doomed to failure as hopeless as the search after perpetual movement. Others think that the contrary extreme is the only tenable position, and reject even such Hmited inferences as may justly be drawn, nay, that our very nature compels us to draw. Those aspire to be as Gods; these are content to thr ow away part of the inalienable birthright of men. WycHf, I think, belongs to the former category. His system was, partly at least, a mistake; but it was the mistake of a bold, powerful, and com- prehensive mind. He and all those of his class were philosophers, gifted with a mighty grasp of thought, and immense mental acumen; whilst the others, however ingenious their subsequent endeavours to reconcile their principles with facts, must, by the laying down of those very principles, strike at the root of aH philosophy, and even of human reason itself.

TRACTATUS TERCIUS

Continuatur.

CAPITULUM NONUM.

B 99'' Sequitur de localibus pertractandum. Supponendo Local

primo omnem ypotheticam adverbio loci copulatam cum '"°o^^pJis"*

proporcionali actu esselocalem; ut est talis: Sor cwrr// all piopositions ^ , . „, . T- • • I • / • fiat are joined

5 ubi Plato curnt. Est autem iste species ypothetice (sicut to another by

causalis, comparativa, et temporalis), affinis cathegoricis, ^*" p^J^"'' °^

cum siena coniuneendi talia convertuntur cum cathe- This species

. . * . rcscinblcs

goricis. Idem enim est dicere: Sor currit iibi Plato categoricals,

currit; et: Sor currit in loco in quo Plato currit. ^^ ^^\-IIq\^^^\^Io

lohinc, 2"^ auctores, adverbia loci et temporis sumuntur ?« /A^ jp/ace »/

quandoque nominaliter pro denominacionibus cathego- thus rendering

ricis a loco et tempore: ut patet de istis: ubi, quando, '^^cateeorfcal°"

nunc, et similibus. Sunt ereo tales proposiciones quante They are

, , . ^ ^ ^ • 1- quantifiable

et quales, ut cathegonce: et per consequens sunt ludi- and qualifiable,

i5cande vere vel false, contradictorie, equipoUentes, vel ^""^ other ''^*^

aliter passionate, sicut cathegorice. Unde hec: Sor non propertics ot

est ubi Plato est, habet 3^ causas veritatis. Vel quia A is noi mhere

alter illorum non est, seu uterque, vel quia idem locus '^true Tit^er'^

non continet utrumque. Ulud tamen non est compos- because one or .... . . . ^ • . the other does

20 sibile cum esse istorum; quia, sicut necessano omnia not exist or

que sunt, simul sunt tempore, sic necessario omnia ^herlaboius

que sunt simul sunt loco communi. Unde, quamvis is ditferent; ^ .... . ^ ^ ^ but this last is

nomen loci sit equivocum, satis tamen est pro nunc not possible

cognoscere locum qui est situs. '^ p^ace^^is'*^'

25 Pro quo noscendo, notandum mundum componi ex equivocal; ^, . ^ . . . • here we shall

certis athomis, et nec posse maioran nec minorari nec deal with it,

moveri recte localiter vel aliter figurari, ita quod tan- ^^''nosiUo"^^" tam multitudinem athomorum coiisequitur tanta quan- The world is ,. r- • ^ u^i made up of

titas continua et tahs hgura, propter causas immutabiles atoms, can be

neither increased nor

I. Cap. decct; blank spjce for initial S. 29. luna''» in marg. B. nor moved iii

2 JOHANNIS WYCIJF CAP. IX.

a straight line, naturales. Aliter enim non esset mundus capacis-

in°shapTfall simus et convenientissimus in figura. Et ex illis sequi-

this is ^-m- situacio mundi et eius duracio. Unde Aristoteles, immutably . . . . . .'

dependent on nommans quantitates contmuas, nommat species per ordi-

tne number i_u^ ^t n • ^ ^ c

of atoms. nem se habentes, ut lineam, superriciem et corpus; et 5

preter hoc locum et tempus, quorum omnium princi-

pium est punctus; et unitas est principium puncti. Et

tam necessario consequitur locus materiam quod ubi-

Site follows cunque fuerit ista maxima materia mundi, ibi est iste

"there 'exLts'^'^ locus. Sic quod, si moveretur recte (per impossibile) lo

the rnass of the jj^ vacuo infinito, foret continue idem situs, cum ad

world, tliere is . . . . .' . .- . '

the same place. mdividuacionem lUius situs sufficit extensio illius materie.

Manet autem necessario ista materia, etsi infinite eius

partes corrumpantur: quia oportet illas continuari ali-

unde cum residuo huius materie. i5

The point is Et sic, quamvis species situs punctalis sit principium

^ 'of^^whi^ch '^ integrandi omnem situm divisibilem, tanquam minimum

partial spaces metrum iUius eeneris, tamen totalis situs mundi est are made up ; . " ...

but that by nobis mensura cognoscendi alios situs particulares, et which we know • • c • .. • » •

these partial pnor in perfeccione et mtencione nature, cum gracia 20

spaces is the jiijug situs quem principaliter intendit, ordinat natura whole extent ot . . . . . . '^ . .... . ...

the world. situm mdivisibilem tociens multiplican 2™ eius mdivi-

has^subtle dua. Si ergo mundus habet ad omnem eius punctum

motioniess partes inmobiles, subtiles, comitanter ad speciem in parts, to which ^ . ' . . ...

is united the animali, cum quibus copulatur virtus mundi regitiva, 25

rulesThe world, <iue facit informaciones vivencium et alia opera laten-

it becomes easy cia ; tunc facile est distingwcre situs parciales, cum qui- to distinguish . ' . . . ^ . . . .

place. Iibet situs parciahs foret talem partem situari. Et | m B 100"

thc°re*can enter talem partem ac eius situm possunt quotlibet corpora

different bodies, yi(;jssjni ingredi, sicut theologi ymaginantur omnem 3o

another. ultimum inmobile se habere. Et illius opinionis vide-

place matter, ^ur fuisse Plato, vocans locum materiam, ylen, vacuum,

emptiness, &c. yel fraudem fictam crassis tenebris involutam. Et quo There is no . ^

difficulty as to ad penetracionem corporum, non plus procederent contra

'^si'nce^'theology' ^^"^ quam contra theologos nostros ponentes quod cor- 35

teaches that it pora possent transire in celum sine eius alteracione vel is not . . . . ...

impossible. corporis sic coextensi corrupcione. Unde Lincolniensis

ponit omnia astra esse corpora mixta ex puritatibus

6. locus B. 24. com'' completur B. 25. copulatur in marg. B.

33. cit, B. 36. lata^coe B. 38. pui^tatibg B.

24. Immobiles, subtiles. I suspect that Wyclif here means the space by which the world is measured. See a few lines below: in talem partem . . . possunt . . . corpora . . . ingredi. "i^.ylen. It ought to be hylen = vlrjv.

CAP. IX. I.OGICA. 3

clementorum. Et dicit esse probabiliter opiniabile quod- libet astrum per se moveri, toto orbe residuo quiescente.

Relictis ereo istis ambiguis, loquendum est de situ Every

^ . . superlunary

qualiter oportet omnes rectiloquos loqui, quomodocun- part of the r ■ L 1 •!• • • • TVT ] 1 world, except

-1 que ruermt probabiliter opiniati. Nam, ponendo quod the poles, is in

quelibet pars superlunaris preter polum continue move- continual T . . . motion.

atur (et sic de qualibet parte sublunari preter terram its matter

,.,.,, . . ] ■ ^ i- j- sutlices for tlie

vel sibi adherencia, ita quod non sit talis pars mundi „nity of its

supernalis quieta): tunc potest dici quod sicut ad in- site; for that

... " . . ^ . . . of ils partial

lodivisioncm situs mundi sufficit ista materia, sic ad in- sites, we have

divisionem situs cuiuslibet partis sue surhcit quod iste reiations with

inundus habeat aliquam partem sic positam in com- }}^^ P°'" ^}'^^ T i i _ , the motionless

paracione ad polos et centrum; que tria quasi omnes centre.

philosophantes dicunt oportere semper quiescere.

i3 Rx quo ulterius concedendum est quod manet con- Piacc is, .... . , . ,. theretorc,

tinue idem situs in numero, propter idemptitatem mundi always

et conformitatem distancie ad duplex quiescens, situato "thT^ame'^^ quantumlibet in substancia variato. Si enim datum if any body is

, , ,.,,,. . alwavs equally

corpus vel quodcunque aliud se habuent contmue per far Irorn the 2ototum eque distanter ad polos mundi et quamlibet P^f- P^^^^g^^J^g^"!"? tem terre quiescentem : tunc est continuo in eodem always in the

,.,... . . . . same place.

situ; ita quod indivisio situs accipitur a gravitate cor- Admitting the

poris ex hiis tribus principiis, non autem a centro clmre^an^d^ the

mundi indivisibili per se quiescente. Unde, si centrum poles, any body ,. , ,. . . , moved in a

2.T mundi et duo poli quiescerent, toto residuo moto, tunc concentric

quilibet motum 2"^ circulum concentricum et eque dis- the'm'would"be

tantem a polo mundi foret continue eque distans ad equally , .. ., . ,., ,. ,. _ , . distant from

hiis tnbus, et m casu a quolibet alio distante. Sed lam them; but the

necessario multa terrena quiescunt, sicut et multe par- thTmotloniess

3o tes celi, respectu quorum sic motum varie se haberet parts of the , ,. . . „. . carth and thc

quo ad distanciam parcium. Sicut ergo contmue manet sky would vary.

iste mundus propter unitatem istius materie, quamvis , ^'^^"''space

illius mundi continue corrumpatur pars, sic propter fiiied bj the ,. , , . ^ ' .'^ . world is thc

umtatem mundi habentis quamcunque partem sic posi- common placc

35 tam, maneret iste situs parcialis, quamvis continue sit ma^nv ^pl'ale*s

nova et nova ubicacio. can be together,

^ . , . , , . .,, . and ihere

(jrave tamen esset videre quid subiectaret illum situm, would be no

ct quod foret ultimum singulare situs. Cum situs datus '"ne^pface^^o

sit commune, et cum omnis situs sit aliquid situari, another.

4ovidetur quod quotlibet situs possunt esse simul, et

unus moveri ad intrinsecum. Et sic locus per accidens

9. fpualis P). 9 — 10. indini" 5 B. 9—10. indini"^ B. 22. ague

generahile (?) B. 25. 2° pro duo B. 28. 3» pro tribus B.

4 JOHANNIS WYCLIF ^AP. IX.

2. One place locaretur, et sic in infinitum procederetur in locacionibus, ^laced ^n sicud et in aliis quantitatibus, sed non per se essent another: which quante. Ista ergo situacio est hoc situari, et non habere mundi vel relacio, cum sit quantitas principians ubi- cacionem alterius generis, sicut tempus principiat ip- 5 3. No two sum quando. \ Et per consequens nil distans a relico B loo'' things di^s^a"* potest esse adequate ubi ipsum relicum est, nec ali- other could quid potest esse alibi quam adequate est, nec aquirere ^pracV^nor"^ locum vel moveri de loco ad locum sibi adequatum. Et '^^"''^from ^^^ ^^'^ specificaretur motus localis per terminum ai lo one place to quem, vel eius materiam, cum nichil potest moveri de

another. ? , ,

loco ad iocum. This cotnes Ista ct multa similia dependent super isto, quod {[^t'" tuatio^ omnis situacio vel locus pertinenter signandus corrum- is lost with the pitur ad quamcunque modicam variacionem subiecti; et i5

sliahtest f, • j 1 •.. ..

variation of the idem sequitur, ponendo locum concavitatem corporis

or that' p?ace is locantis, et longe magis absurda ponendo nullum locum

a hollow in the preter corpvis locans, quia pari evidencia negaretur

^"'^body,'"^ quodlibet accidens. Et deficerent verba ad exprimendum

or denying^that magnitudinem, adquisicionem vel immobilitatem loci, 20

other place but cum aliis philosophice de loco locutis. Nam tam homo

^and sucfi' quam bestia habet innatam sibi potenciam ad cogno-

ontra^krthe scendum mobile mutare locum suum, sicut patet de

very, naturali noticia situs, posicionis, distancie, et opposi-

^"userin"* cionis. Ideo sicut in natura omne motum vel mobile inni- 25

speaking of ^-^^j. g^\i(^^\ f^^o, sic non est possibile nos locum cog-

Men and noscere, nisi in comparacione ad aliquod fixum. Sicut animals know , , • -^ 1 •_ 1

that a moving ergo mundus ad eius motum situalem presuppomt polos

body changes ^^ centrum quieta, sic presupponit ad eius situacionem As the eadem, saliem 2"^ speciem, quieta. Et sic vere dicit 3o

movement ot , ^ ,. ^ !•.. •

the world, so commentator quod centrum mundi est causaliter eius

•^^ ^u"po°e" locus; et per idem uterque polus, non quod situs in-

certain fixed divisibilis sit formaliter situs mundi, sed quod hii 3*

points. .... , j *•

Thus these situs pnncipiant, tam quo ad esse quam quo ad noti-

*^oi"sand\he ciam, situm mundi et cuiuslibet sue partis. Cum ergo 35

centre) cause mens prius cogitat singulare fixum quam situm, non

situation^of the mirum si a tali individuat locum, et si locatum quan-

^^^^^- tumlibet varietur.

Answers. Ad primum argumentum, dicitur quod situs parcialis

I. Situation ^^ primo subiective in communi ad quamcunque par- 4<> belonss r ,

primariiy to tem mundi sic positam, et ab iUo communi non potest

every part of

the world out of which ^ ,1

nothing can go; 4. mdi B. 8. aqre B. 9. locum deest B. i3. dependentes B.

23. mo'» mur' B.

CAP. IX. I.OGICA. 5

migrare, Universalia enim sunt alicubi, et generabilia, but it belongs

et corruptibilia per accidens, ut patet ex dictis superius. ^''y^e^ry^particular

Sed per accidens subiectatur in quacunque singulari P^'"^-

parte mundi sic posita, licet non dependet a tali.

5 Pro 2° notandum quod aliqua forma individuatur 2 Some forms

. . . . are

a subiecto proximo: ut ista sessio, ab isto homine se- individuated by

dente; aliqua a subiecto remoto: ut ista caHditas aeris, ^syjj^jgj^^^^grl^

a materia prima. Ideo manet eadem caliditas in numero, by a subject

'^ . . ,. ,.,.., that is remote,

aere converso in igne^ licet non eadem individuatur quo others by

10 ad svibiectum proximum. Et 3° individuatur forma a suo ext°r?ns?c'"yct principio extrinseco, licet sit communis subiecto: ut, iste also belonging

. ^ . , . . ,.,.,. ., . ' to the subiect;

situs, qui est ultimum smgularis loci, licet sibi possunt as in this last

accidere quotlibet ubicaciones. Nam ubicacio individuatur '^^^^'

a subiecto et a loco, qui non est communis predica-

iScione, sed causacione, ad quotlibet tales situs. Ad 3"^ 3. r.od Himself

dicitur quod deus non potest facere duos situs coex- two^differem

B loi" tendi, nec duo puncta, 1 vel sua subiecta esse simul in places to , . • ,• • •, •!• TT ... coincide;

eodem situ indivisibili. Verumptamen contmgit duo cor- but two bodies

pora esse simul in unum ad omnem punctum alterius J^j^jj^^^^^^g^j* .^"j

20 cum hoc quod quilibet punctus alterius illorum habeat havc all their ... . T^ , , points scparate.

situm sibi propnum. Ex hoc patet quod non oportet,

si ubicunque extenditur A extenditur B, et econtra,

quod ipsa coextenduntur, sic quod quilibet punctus unius

sit in omni situ formaliter in quo est punctus alterius.

25Est ergo situs per se quantus et inmobilis: per se Site is thus a

quantus, quia quantus sine alio formaliter ipsum quan- u^serf^and

tificante, copulatus ad eundem terminum communem motionless: by

itscif sincc

ad quem pars corporis; ut docet Aristoteles. Est tamen nothing else

alterius racionis quam profunditas. Ideo non obest q^'Jntitv-

Soillam coextendi cum profunditate sine composicione ali-

cuius 3"; nec possit moveri, nisi eadem distancia in and motionless;

numero possit maiorari et minorari. DifFero autem a argumerit

solucione argumenti quo probatur quod, mundi moto proving that ?/ . -1 r ....^ . . the world were

recte versus onens, moveretur quilibet situs eius, quo- moved in a

35 usque probatus fuerit casus assumptus. Sicut ergo res its^^sife^^wouW

universalis est immobilis, sic et locus. be moved,

-.,,..,' . . . assumes what

Unde descnptive locus est quantitas conttnua, immo- is impossible.

bilis, permanens, qua corpus formaliter est locatum ; licet ^^'^'face"* °^

auctor sex principiorum extendat locum ad omnem lo- Gilbert de la . . . ■ Porr^c s

40 cacionem substancie sive punctalis sive corporee; Ari- definition

stoteles autem, 4° Physicorum, vocat locum ultimum ^^^^^^^'^^^^^

but Aristotle implicitly says ^ the same.

12. singularis (!) B. 3o. gpoe B. 3i. v' nec in marg. B.

39. a»"- B.

6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

corporis continentis immobile primiim; quod intelligitur

de agregato ex superficie concava locantis et respectu

ad predicta principia loci. Illud enim immobile, et non

ultimum convexum corporis locantis, sed ultimum con-

cavum quod est primum et inmediatvim continens. 5

Partial site is ^x istis patet quod quelibet pars situs mundi est founded on . _ , ^ . ^ • j

universal site. situs fundatus in communi ad quamcunque partem

Site difters mundi sic positam. Et per consequens tam quelibet

trom situation .... . • i- -^ • j-

particularis situacio quam universalis situacio mundi partis, est alterius racionis quam situs qui est locus. lo not only in Et notandum quod propter istam diflferenciam habendam ^^"ense^^^Ue" credo quod hec nomina situs et situacio inventa. Omnis causessituation. gnim situacio partis mundi causatur a situ; quia quot- However, in the libet tale itbi causatur a loco; quod idem est. In mundo p"o"ysTnd\he tamen et primo subiecto situs idem est situs, posicio, i5 centre, site and e^ situacio. situation are . .^ .... ... ,.

identical. Et sic sunt sex differencie loci vel posicionis mundi:

^^oi plllltTo^n"* scilicet, sursiim et deorsum, que sunt termini longitu- up and dotm, Jinis ; dextruni et sinistrum, que sunt termini latitudinis;

for lengih: ' • • r j^ .• t j

right and left ante et retrOy que sunt termmi prorunditatis. In mundo 20

^before^&nd' autem et quolibet animali perfecto sunt iste sex diffe-

behind, for rencie quorsumcunque ubicantur absolute fixe. Et in

depth. ,. ,. . TTj • 1 ■

These are aliis dicuntur comparative. Unde, ymagmato homme

un^cha^ilgM^le cuius capud sit in polo antarctico et pedes in polo

in the world arctico, manus dextra in oriente et sinistra in occi- 20 an.d in perfect ' ...,,.,.. ,

animals. dente; tunc posicio illius hommis corresponderet posi-

cioni mundi.

There arc also Sed preter istas posiciones est dare alias posiciones

°"j-elativc'\o"* parcium mundi respectu sui centri: ut res est eo supe-

diffcront parts j-Jqj. Jjj mundo quo 2"^ se vel aiiquid sui est distancior 3o

of the world: . ^ . rr, 1 !• • 1 • 1

As anything is a centro, et eo inferior quo 2™ se vel aliquid sui | estBioi' from^hf cemre, distancior a circumferencia mundi Ex quo patet quod it is higher, j^qj^ eg^- possibile centrum esse supra aliquid vel infe-

and lower as it . ^ . , . ^ ,. • i- •

is farther from rms quam est, nec circumrerenciam mundi esse inreri- circumt^rence orem vel infra aliquid, aut superius quam est. Unde false 35

of the universe. ^j-^gunj; quiJam ponentes deum posse rarefacere mun- Nothing can be » . 7 ^ ^

above the dum m infinitum vel condensare versus centrum, aut

nor^b^low^the movere ipsum motu recto, nisi forte equivocando intel-

centre. lexerint quod ipse habet potenciam ad hoc, si posset

iieri; sicut ego possum videre bestiam mortuam, ipsa 40

12. ftt^ B. 22. v'ca^ B. 34. circumferencia B ib. inferior B.

21. Animali perfecto. Because it is able to perceive what is before and what behind, &c.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 7

obiecta michi. Res autem multiplicatas non repugnat As for bcings esse supra se vel sub se; et sic de ceteris differenciis, space^^hey can cum tunc sit res multiplicata localiter, quando complete ^e both above

.. , . , .,...,.,. ^ , and below

est per diversa loca, sicut deus est mdivisibihter ad themselves;

5 omnem punctum mundi, et anima ad omnem punctum th\ soul'

sui subiecti. Proprie autem muUiphcatur commune in ^"'^ universals,

, ■, ■ . , V. g. the

suis snigularibus, cum sit eorum singulum; ut punctus universal idca

communis muhipUcatur per totum mundum; et sic, °Bu^t?hdr'

quantum possibile est aliquid extensive multiplicari. individuals ^ , , , , . ' . cannot be thus

loSed de puncto, loco, vel quantitate permanente smgu- really

lari, non est possibilis talis realis multiplicacio, quam- Though^a^n vis substancia singularis corporea bene possit multi- individual plicari: sic quod alicubi sit materialiter et alibi inten- be multiplied cionaliter vel sacramentaliter. sacramentally.

15 Ex istis patet quod mundus non simpliciter sed 2"^ Thus the suas partes est suprema res et infima possibilis. Sed onrphce'*the videtur michi quod superficies extima mundi sit alcior highest and in

. n-. • • !• • •! -1 • • another the

ipso et extra ipsum 2™ situm indivisibilem, nisi pars lowest possible

mundi superficialis subiectet illam, et per idem centrum j think^tfat the

2o mundi esset inferius quam aliquod permanens continue circumference „.,.,., . . ,,, is by one

magnum. ht sic de cuiushbet corporis termmo. Non indivisible

enim foret substancia superior vel inferior propter eius and"bev'ond ^thc

accidens terminans, si ipsum non subiectetur in aliqua world itself;

, . , ^, . so also of all

eius parle pocms quam propter bonitatem, vel alia surfaccs.

20 eius accidencia, quantumlibet distancia^ aut propter

talem terminum per se existentem in eodem situ quo

infimo non continuatum cum terminato.

Sed pro-aliis 4°^" differenciis notandum quod omne Every animal

animal absolute habens istas differencias habet 3* hneas "^^posftions^^'^

Sodimensionales orthogonaliter se secantes in medio; et has three ,. . ,. . , ,. dimensions

sex medietates concomitantes divise per tales tres hneas that intersect

obiciuntur sex differenciis posicionum, sic quod quilibet '^in^^e^cenfre'^

extra medium talis animalis inter tales lineas, quantum- of its body, ... . , , : . and six

iibet protractas, est comparative dextrum vel sinistrum, corresponding

35 et cetera, huiusmodi animali. Et sic conclusio patet '^fo^weV"^'c!'^' quod stat idem non multiplicatum esse sextupliciter Thus the same

, ,.^ . . ,. . , ' , thing can have

positum quo ad dirierencias animahs; ut idem est dex- six different trum michi, ante me, et supra me etc, ; sicut patet de P°|a^^g"(i^y^*^ toto residuo mundi extra me. Nam circulare est maxime relatively to

that animal ;

24. bo"" B. 27. quomfmo B. 34._ptctas B. 3j. ds al B.

27. Infimo. The word might read in sjimmo, without the sense of this sentence being cleaver or the reverse. When I copied the MS. I found the word was most like insivero.

8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

proporcionatum esse multipliciter positum respectu ani-

as tor instancc, malis, sicut et deus est maxime denominatus taliter re-

^'ifnd^GoT'^ spectu diversorum quo aliquid potest esse. Nam si ali-

quod causatum habuerit dextrum, sinistrum etc. ; tunc

deus est sibi dexter, sinister etc. 5

To the right Ex quibus colligi potest quod tripliciter dicitur ad

'"'^either"'*^ dextrum; primo modo summe dextrum ; sicut est qui-

absolutely so, ^ibet punctus linee dextralis, et omne quod 2"^ se totum 1

as a hne \ , ,/ \. n i „

produced to est ad talem punctum. Voco autem lineam dextralem B lo: '"^unfil'\lie^'^ ^"^ protenditur versus dextrum usque ad finem mundi lo

circumference orthoeonaliter correctam super lineam loneitudinalem.

of the world; ^ ^. " .

or simply so; 2° modo dicttur ad dextrum simphciter quod sic est

which^no^part dextrum quod nulla eius pars est non dextra, sicut est

is to my left; medietas mundi et quelibet 2"'' se totum in illa respectu V. g. one halt .„,,.., -

of theuniversc; mei. Et j° modo dicitur dextrum ^"''partem; ut omne i^

as^^a^^body that corpus circumdans me, et sic de aliis differenciis etc.

surroundsme. £x quibus patet quod stat simpliciter dextrum esse The right halt . ^ ,. . ^ . ^ • ,• , ,. .

of the universe quintupliciter positum respectu animalis; quadruphciter

a^bove^^beidw, 2"^ partes, et 5° modo simphciter. Nam medietas mundi before and egj- simpliciter dextra michi, et est supra me, sub me, 20

behind me: ^ . ' . ,. '^ „ , ,

while it is ante me, et retro me; licet partiahter. Sed solum 2''

"'"^righ°. '"^ dicitur aliquid alteri summe positum; ut idem est

There are only i^Jchi summe dextrum et summe sinistrum ; ut patet

two absolute . ,. 7 r

positions of a de puncto terminante Imeam dextralem.

Sophilts Scio tamen quod multe sunt altercaciones sophistice: 25

say that a ^t unus dicit nichil esse supra me, nisi 2"^ se totum thing cannot bc . .

called above ?ne fuerit supra me; et sic mundus nec est supra me nec sub-

above^i'n &\\ ter aliquid; quia sequitur penes eos: A est supra B ; ergo,

its parts. A est superius quam B; quia aliter capud hominis esset According to . '^ 1 1 1 r

them, to be supra ipsum; et sic esset corpus supra se, sub se, et ita 3o

%°be hi"^iel de aliis differenciis. Pro istis alteracionibus suppono quod

than. omne supra aliud est esse 2"^ se vel aliquid sui in situ, But it any . ^. . , . . . ^ . , '

part of A is qui est situ adequato mrerions superior; et sic homo

above the ^ ,. • ^ •

whole of B i^on est supra se, nec aliqua pars quantitativa rei est then A is supra vel sub suo toto; et sic de ceteris differenciis, 35

above B ^ .... .. ,.

according to ut patet ex diffinicione quid nominis supra dicta. Sed ThVs^a^man is nori video quomodo posset dari quam alta vel quam

not above profunda foret res, nisi racione sue partis altissime aut

himself, though ^ . . ' ,. . ^ . , .

his head is profundissime. Unde res 2"" aliquid sui alcior quam above his body.

I. aJis = anim.alis.' B. ii. errcam B. i6. 2=y' pro differenciis B.

i8. alTs B. 22. alr' B.

36. Quid nominis. A verbol definition, that merely explains what is meant by a given word.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 9

reliqua 2''" aliquid sui dicitur esse supra reliquam, et ipsa superior. Et correspondenter de aliis difFeren- ciarum denominacionibus. Sed non oportet, si aliqua pars date significat aliqua parte altei'ius dande supe- 5 rior, eciam quod exinde sit prima res superior. Sed , '^^'^ 'i -^ i^

' ^ ... . above B )t does

oportet capere denominaciones huiusmodi 2"^ supremum not follow

vel ultimum talis denominacionis. Ex quo patet non below A.

sequitur, si A sit supra B, quod B sit sub A, ut patet

de homine et corde suo; et proporcionaliter de aliis

lo consequenciis.

Sed relinquendo ista sophistis et redeundo ad con- -j-],,; uppcr

clusiones priores, patet quod omne absolute habens iialf ot any .... . . animal

istas denommaciones habet sex medietates communi- contains

cantes, quarum quelibet continet ^*^"" medietates com- i.^gh['^tiie left

i5 municantes 4°'" parcium aliis denominacionibus subiec- ^''^. f°'"? ^"^* ^'^^

.,7 , ^ , . . . ,. lii"'^ lialvcs;

torum; ut illud quod est primo sursum in animali con-

tinet medietatem partis dextre, et sic de parte sinistra,

de parte anteriori et parte posteriori; et sic de aliis

medietatibus. Nam ad omnem punctum sic positum for at eycry

20 continentur quinque denominaciones; et ad medium extension^we

punctum exclusive concurrunt sex posiciones predicte. fi"'* ^hese five %• , ,. . . . ^ ,. . positions,

Sed medius punctus sic positi non refertur aliqua ista- while the

rum 6 denominacionum respectu illius positi, sicut nec ^hei^r^arting

centrum respectu mundi. Nam medietas inferior mundi po'"'^? \i'''^ "°"^ .... I . ,. ot them.

B102'' est ab equmocciali | usque ad polum articum, et alia The lower half

medietas incommunicans cum illa est pars superior gxtendTfrom^

eius; et medietas mundi a Colubro usque ad polum orien- t^? equinoctial

, ,. ,? ,. . circle to the

talem est pars dextra mundi, et alia medietas mcom- arctic pole and

municans est pars sinistra. Medietas vero ab oriente ^ upper^haVV''

Bousque ad cenit habentibus speram rectam est pars and so on for ^ . ,. ^ . ^ the other

antenor; et relica est pars postenor. divisions.

Ex istis patet quod sub et siipra in mundo sunt equi- Above and

voca. Nam aliquando dicunt altitudinem et bassitudinem, jnd^i^ateniere

ut supra dictum est, et aliquando dicunt absolute posi- height and r- ■ 1- ,- • , • ,• • , depth, or

35 cionem mundi. Et sic polus articus dicitur summe sub- absolutc

ditus in mundo; bassissimum tamen et infimum possi- P°^'^°"y" ^ "^

bile ad sensum expositum est centrum mundi. Unde, 7«)"ox^ and

, . , ^, . , . , bottommost are

solum in mundo vel concentrico cum mundo, est idem identical only,

5. ze' pro eciam B. i3. me'«' B. 14. me'«s B. 17. me'5 B.

19. media»» B. 20. et ad B. 27. coluro B. 33. al^ B. 38. fo" B.

25. Equinocciali. This may be a mistake for the Equator. 27. Colubro. The consteliation of the Serpent. 3o. Cenit.

The zenith.

lO JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

for spheres esse infimum et intimum. Nam generaliter centrum rei

is^ha^toTthe ^st eius intimum, quia maxime intra illam. Sed non

wodd. in eccentrico est centrum maxime infra, quia tunc ni-

chil esset eq inferius. Non ergo est infimum. All these gx istis patet quod iste differencie posicionis susti- 5

positions . ^ .^ , , ,

admit of nent magis et minus, et quod est dare summum vel 'ammfasY maximum possibile in tali denominacione: ut summe themselves, dextrum, summe sinistrum, etc. Patet eciam quod omnis

and also a , ,. . , ,

maximum of locus est equalis suo maximo locato et adequato; et

Eve^iT p'i'ace'is V^^ consequens mensurat ultimum gradum magnitudinis lo

cqual to the locati. Sed hic est dubium quomodo locus quantificat

ciulnlity that locatum et est in illo, cum idem locatum quantificat

""^" in i^''*'^'^'^ locum. Sed dicitur quod multum equivoce dicitur ali-

Place gives quid quantificare aliud, et esse in illo.' Aliquid enim dimension to ^ ., ,. , ^,, . . , ^•r- ^ .z

the thing quantificat ahud efhcienter, sicut deus quantihcat omne i3

placed, an^d quantum, et corpus continens quantificat suum conten-

dimensions tum, sicut et locus. Sed quantitas, que est dimensio, for-

itTeTeives maUter quantificat subiectum suum et efficienter requan-

dimension tificatur ab eodem. Unde situs non est formaliter sub- tormally irom the quantity iective in ahqua parte mundi, nec lormahter illam 20

and^ il^gwVs quantificans, nec ab illa quantificatus, Sed locus ponitur

dimension as accidens efficienter quantificare suum subiectum

an eincicnt t . . . . . .

cause, though locatum, sicut est generati principium, quamvis non sit

'onet^it^^merely de genere activorum. AHud enim est facere et aHud ''^^■'h^i^ts agere. Oportet ergo omnem locurn corporeum coequare 25 subject has sibi suum locum; et de tanto habet locus racionem imension. |-Qj.j^g quod ponit locatum in suis Hmitibus quo ad

quantitatem et figuram. Position, De loco vero mundi, videtur quod sit valde propin-

dimension and ^^^^ gue dimensioni et figure. DifFerunt tamen ab in- 3o

shape are "l ^ . . , . ,. ...

almost identical vicem, cum quehbet pars quantitativa loci munai ait-

concerns^^e fert a parti quantitativa dimensionis vel figure sue. Nec

dff^^^as^^resards ^^^ inconveniens, sed necessarium, quod ahqua reci-

thcmselves, and proce se quantificant in diversis generibus causandi; et

^'^'^otheT tahter sunt reciproce in seipsis. Unde hcet in 5° phi- 3b

sicorum dicatur aliquid esse octupliciter in aho, tamen

in three tripHciter 2"^ genus unum potest dici in aUo, Primo

a's the"effect^hi modo, sicut causatum in sua causa; et tahter omnis

its cause, forma est in suo subiecto tanquam in causa suscipiente as the cause in t _ . ^-

its eftect, denominacionem. 2° modo omnis causa est in suo 40

causato, et omne subiectum forme est in illa forma:

I. intinitum B. 3. inec^ct^co B. 23. qnati B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. I I

ut homo cst in substancialitate active vel passive, et ignis in igneitate, homo in humanitate; et sic de aliis similibus. Et 3° modo dicitur in alio sicut in suo °'' ^* 'h^

coiitents in

extnnseco continente, ut liquor m vase. Et hec dicta that which

^•11 ct2 ■ ^ I coiitains thcm.

D pro presenti de loco surhciant. | From thc

BioS" Habita noticia de loco, incidit pertinenter tractare de cmisideration

. . j *^* placc, we

motu locah, cuius materia est locus; et contingenter de pass to that of aliis. Sed incipiendo a priori, supponatur quod motus movernent. in communi sit actus vel forma quo mobile formaliter Defimtion ot

... ^ , . . movemcnt in

lo movetur. Et est duplex, scilicet subitus et successivus. general.

Successivus, ut motus localis, alteracio, augmentacio, vel ^ '^into

dimimicio: et subitus, ut s:eneracio vel corrupcio sub- instantaneous . P . ^ ("eneration and

stancie. Et patent descnpciones istorum. dissolution) and

Motus autem localis, quo ad eius principium subiec- '^"'^j^g^^Jjfe;;?/'' i5tivum, dividitur in motum per se et motum per acci- variation,

' . . •,•! • i^-i • increase, and

dens. Quamvis autem impossibue sit ahquid moveri, dimimuion).

nisi moyeatur per accidens, tamen ad propositum re- rnovement is

stringitur motus per accidens ad motum localem, sine , either

° .-^ . , -^ . . , , substantial (as

eius per se existencia vel sufhciencia ad replendum that of a

2olocum: ut forme dilate cum subiectis motis, et que- or"acddcntal

cunque partes quantitative. Sed per se movetur loca- (as that of an

^ r ^ -t^ _ accidcnt).

liter quecunque per se substancia corporea que ex m-

clinacione eius intrinseca movetur, ut corpora.

Et hoc dupliciter; vel concomitante violencia ab Substantial

2 5 extrinseco, sicut est in pulsione, traccione, veccione, et "^j°o/"«/'or^^

vertigine; vel sine violencia, ut est in motu celi et ut natura!

creditur in elementis motis ad sua loca naturalia cum

iuvamine removentis medium prohibens et influencia (^n'* ''",

^ . . movement here

ceh que generavit elementum et dedit sibi talem appe- below is

'>..•.. r^ -u u-\ ^ .. j ■ .. 1 1" probablv more

aotitum. Probabile tamen est quod omnis motus locahs or less violent).

istorum inferiorum est cum violencia; ut aliquod cor-

pus movetur sine quadam naturali inclinacione.

Sed per se motorum aliquid movetur per se et ex ^'-'(^'

. .... . proceeding

se, ut anmiata que possunt prmcipiari motus suos sine (either self- .. • •!•..... •n^ .. L 1 determincd or

3j motivo extrmseco simul existente cum ilhs; et hoc vel not)

sine aliquo motivo extrinseco, ut homines et celum

(si sit animatum;, vel cum movente obiective extrinseco

apprehenso; sicut animaha. Inanimata autem mota or proceeding

naturahter per se, cum quieverunt, non habent de se extrinsic cause.

40 sufficienciam ad inchoandum motum ; ut lapis non

I. ho B; ib. fai'" H. 5. .4/fer sufficiant a blankspace for 4 ivords ]i. 19. exn^ B. 2?. cor" B. 28. infitiencie B. 38. moHa B.

12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

surgit post quietem, sicut facit bestia memorans obliti sempiternaliter immutantis. Semper tamen ab influencia celi vel alio sempiternaliter movente moventur mutabilia nota; ut patet de motis ad generandum sibi simile in certo tempore anni, vel prosequentibus delectabile aut 5 fugientibus tristabile. Homo autem, cum anima sua non subiacet necessitata motibus astrorum, potest movere Some bodies se localiter contra inclinacionem extrinseci, Ideo celum whoks^some ^^ homo perfectc possunt moveri ex se. Et movencium

as subjects of ge quedam moventur 2^ se tota, quedam sunt subiecta lo

movement, . ^ ' ^

some as parts prima motus, et quedam 2™ partem, ut mota quorum

ofwholes. pg^^^g quiescunt.

Nothing can be Ex istis divisionibus bene notatis patet quod impos-

moved locally, . . . .... . . / ,.

unless it be sibile est quicquam moveri locaiiter, nisi ab alio move- someUiii^n^g^ellse. ^tur. Si enim sit corpus quod movetur, tunc vel mo- i5

It is either a yetur ab extrinseco et sic ab alio: vel a parte eius body or an . . ., . .,

indivisible mota, cum impossibile est signare totum mobile motum,

if the' fi^st it ^'^^^ ?^^^ ^^^^ P^^ suum motum faciat totum moveri,

is either qq quod talis pars sufficeret per se denominare totum moved trom ^. '^ ... . , ,,.

without, or moveri, et non stat iUum parcialem motum subduci, 20

part"o/h:sdf "i^^ ^^^ totum non moveatur vel alio motu moveatur. which itself ijeo certum est quod motus talis partis 1 est causa Bio3'

requires to be ■* '

moved by quare totum movetur, et per consequens totum movetur

^n^the^relo^ild^' ^b alio. Si autem indivisibile moveatur, vel violente aut

it is moved per accidens movebitur (et sic ab alio), vel ex naturali 25

against or f ,. . ■ i- •/-•.. •

beside mclmacione, et per consequens gracia ahcuius nnis, et sic or according , ,•

to its nature. ■*" diiu. This proves Et ex istis, cum paucis addendis, concludi potest

tliat there is a , , . '^ . , ., .....

First Mover quod est dare primum motorem immobuem, mdivisi- °motionlesr' bilem, et eternum. Supponendum enim est ex sensu 3o indivisible, cornora celestia moveri localiter, ut patet de astris.

etcrnal. * r n ' r

The sky 2° supponatur [quod] totum agregatum corporum mo-

TtTs^finitel torum, sicut et totus mundus sit causatum finitum ;

both are quia, si esset infinitum, nichil potest ascendere vel des-

The superior cendere, cum non esset aliqua diff"erencia loci supra- 35

sky^moTC thoscdicta. Omnes enim ille differencie supponunt medium.

beiow, and Istud patet de spera corruptibiiium mota a celo, et not vice versa. ^ ...... , . . .

de parte ceii mfenori mota ab eius parte supenon,

et non econtra; quia tunc moveretur celum valde dif-

formiter quo ad tempus propter diversitatem motorum,4o

et esset mutua dependencia in eodem genere causandi.

2. fpua' rmut>' B. 3. fpna' B. 3o. ex B. 32. quod deest B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 13

et per consequens idem prius se ipso. Istis suppositis, T^^""? '!""!''

patet quod est dare corpus ultimum motum ex 2^ sup- a first mobile,-

positione; et illud movetur ab alio ex conclusione, sed ^"mobile is^^

non a corpore inferiori ex proxima supposicione; ergo moved by

3 a motore eque primo vel priori dato mobili. Et illum

oportet esse primum motum, sicut suum mobile est

primum mobile.

Hic potest fingi quod primus motor est forma ex- it may be said

tensa primi mobilis; vel 2" quod spera superior movet ^ Mover is^^

10 inferiorem, et econtra propter concathenacionem eorum the torm of the ' . r r _ _ fjrst mobile

2'" concentncitatem vel exceniricitatem; vel 3° quod coextended

eiusdem orbis quelibet pars moveat aliam, sicut est de ^^'{he^infedor'' trocho circumducto, qui eternaliter moveretur, si non bodies react

' ^ . ■ 11- 1 upon the

impediretur a corrumpente, nec ab extrinseco colhdente superiors, or

i5nec ab appetitu quem forma habet ad quiescendum. ot^^tlie^vo^^rtd

Cum ergo ista non possunt fingi in celo, videtur quod turns ^nother

ad perpetuitatem motus celi non oportet ponere intel- would move

!• ■ 1- j for ever, were

ugenciam moventem, et per consequens non alium deum j^ not for a corpore celesti, „ fricnon.

^ . So God is not

20 Omnia ista tolluntur per hoc quod celum regulanter necessary. difformiter movetur, ac si esset unum proporcionaliter AlTfiie^se motum; quod nulla trium viarum potest solvere. Nec subterfuges are

. ^ ..... met by the

est philosophicum ponere talem violenciam in celo. fact that the

Sed 3° tollentur dicte ficticie per [dicta] alibi. Probatur reg\?lady^and

25 quod oportet totum senus cause materialis esse propter yet not with ^ ^ ^ ,. ' a uniform

causam formalem, et totum genus cause formalis esse movement; for

propter compositum quod est per se efficiens; et totum ^j^^Q^^g^^^^J^n,

eenus talium oportet esse propter causam finalem ; et The first causc

^. . '^ r r /21 cannot be

sic primam causam oportet esse causam finalem et non extended;it Bocorpoream, quia tunc dependeret a partibus et haberet ^on^each^oflts causam ipsa priorem. Omne ergo corpus habet finem parts, andbe ipsum limitantem, gracia cuius est sic activum, cum them. non potest esse tam ordinatus motus nisi ab ordinante dlre^ct 'itsdf' preter corporeo, quem oportet perfeccius cognoscere to its own end; 35 suum ordinatum quam homo suum ordinatum, sicut therefore one

r • • ..•/-> who directs it,

operacio nature est perfeccior operacione artis. Corpus ^^^ ^^^ jg ^^^

ergo primum, cum non 2"^ se totum ordinat, habet rnatter, nor ,••,•,,• 1- , • lorm, nor

ahquid in eo quod ordinat alia, quod non potest poni having

corporeum propter eius operacionem et perfeccionem. quantity.

40 Est enim perfeccius primo corpore, cum sit finis ordi-

nans ipsum et omnia alia ordinata; et per consequens

i3. troco B. 24. dicta deest. 28. tlim B. 34. cor»» B.

14 JOHANNTS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

Immovable and nec est eius materia, nec forma, nec pars quantitativa. etenfal^truths Est ergo indivisibile. Et cum non possit | moveri abBio^* God is also alio, patet quod sit immobile, et cum sit prima causa

eternal. ' ' ? . . r n

et necessano sint ventates eterne, patet [quod] est

eternum^ sive mundus incepit esse, sive non. ^

Aristoile's view Sermo autem Aristotelis in ista materia est multum

"is dVs^ta^s^tefur insipidus propter extraneitatem terminorum et suppo-

because of his siciones multas incoenitas. Certissimum tamen est phi-

strange , , , , , •

tcrminology losopho quod, extra totum munduin et totam multitu-

hypotheses^. dinem causatorum, oportet dare causam iUius tocius lo

, ., riie multitudinis, quia aliter esset causatum sine propor-

philosopher can . ' ^ n

have no doubt cionah causa. Nec possunt esse multe tales cause hna-

t]Ie n^ecessi^ty of l£s ilHus multitudinis eque primo causantes, quia tunc

admitting one multiplicarentur eracia speciei prioris et causantis eadem, First cause ot . ^ ^ . ^ . ,. '

all. sicut patet ponentibus universaha. i5

Movement is Secundo autem dividitur motus localis in compara-

or cow^Tzfw^,- cione ad eius puncta et materiam in ipso aquiribilem;

simple when it ^^ alius est motus shnvlex, et alius est motus compositus, is one natural . ■'^ ' . ■'^

movement of Simplex autem m proposito vocatur motus naturalis,

''"'tliiiigT'^'* homogenius, corporis naturalis; et motus compositus 20 compound, es|- motus competens animato a forma superaddita; ut

when it . i^. .t^ . .'

proceeds from progressio, repcio et volatus competunt animah. Et istos

prin^ciple: motus comitantur multi motus diversarum specierum et

as walking, &c. multe quietes. Ideo totum agregatum vocatur motus

compositus. 2.T

Simple Motus autem simplex quidam est rectus, ut ascensus

movement is . . . ^ . .

straight OT et descensus, 2^ divisionem gravium et levium; et

TheTatter aione qi-^iJani circularis, ut motus corporis. Neutri perpetui:

is believed to solum enim talis motus creditur esse perpetuus. Ideo be perpetual, .... . ...

and is the most principalissime competit corpori circumferri perpetuo, 3o

movement that propter proporcionalem perfeccionem. Quod si aliqua pars

is possible to orbis celestis ascenderit vel descenderit, hoc erit 2™ pro- matter. . . . ... ...

porcionem circuli, et propter inclmacionem altenus cui

inexistit, et non propter situm alciorem vel bassiorem

in quo appetit quiescere, sicut gravia et levia. 33

To circular Unde, 2'" philosophos, motus circularis non habet

movement there . . . .

is no contrary ; motum sibi contrarium, quia motus circulans potest with^upward or P^r totum inesse corpori moto per totum ascensum vel

downwaid descensum. Ideo non contrariatur illis, cum eidem

movement, '

4. quod deest 15. 17. pu^'' B ; {h. aq^ri''™ B. 20. wTafter corporis B. 3o. pu' ">« B. 32. cor'»; orb above B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 15

subiecto primo possunt isti simul inesse. Et 2'^ astro- aud circular

' ..... . . , movement from

nomos^ motus circulans ab oriente m occidens com- east to west

patitur secum per totum subiectum sic motum, alium "'^^^ fasrm^ay^^

circularem motum ab occidente in oriens; et multo also coexist.

5 maeis alios motus circulares super diversos poles. As- But ascent and

, .. . , descent are

census autem et descensus contrani sunt; quia sunt due contrary.

species motus quas impossibile est idem singulariter

per se motum simul et semel subiectare primo. Nam Not that the

'^ ,.,..., , , j same body

stat multipliciter simul tempore ascendere et descendere, cannot ascend

H. sicut et corpus non multipliciter 2"^ partes, sed non t^ie^^samrtlme-

simul per totum. Unde, 2"^ philosophos, non solum 2"^ but the same

. ' . , ^ . '^ . „ . body as a

terminos contranos sed penes mtencionem nnis penes n,hole, cannot. motum medii et motus quibus adquiruntur illi termini, attenditur, motuum contrarietas. Nec sequitur ex istis Yet though

. , , . without a

iStunc motum circularem esse perpetuum, sed pocius contiary, probabiliter infert oppositum, cum motus celi non sit n^ovement is solum propter finem habitum placendum, sed propter probably not

, , , eternal ■ it is

finem habendum, ut perfeccionem universi in produc- for an end^, and cionibus animarum; et cum hoc non possit procedere ^^jjjjjgj ^^"''^^.jii 20 in infinitum, philosophis est ponere quod aliquando cease. cessabit motus celi.

Sedpro specificacione motuum sunt 3" notanda. Primo "^^ust^^be"^^

quod aUquis est ver se terminus ad quem motus, et noticed here.

auus non per se. Per se termmus motus est denominacio terminus of

25 accidentalis quam oportet mobile ut sic motum ad is^Jo^^^ther^frr

B 104" quirere 1 et in fine motus habere ut ubicacio localiter itself ot not ;

. ' . , . 1. e. a terminus

moti. 1 ermmus autem ad quem, sed non per se ter- to attain which minus motus, est quecunque forma que in fine primo ''^^is'",^ad'^.^"^ habetur a moto, quam non oportet ipsum formaliter or one which is

.. '^ . . . ^ . ,,. attained, but

3o adquirere tanquam prmcipmm sui motus, sive msit which was extrinsece et non formaliter ut locus, sive intrinsece princ^pie^^of the et formaliter: ut sanguis post laborem ; et quodlibet movement. contingit esse tales terminos accidentales motui. 2° no- 2"'' There may

, , • • • bc Gsscntisl

tandum quod de motu, sicut de aliis naturis, contmgit and accidental

35aliquas esse per se species, et alias species per accidens; movement,

que quidem species sunt capte ab accidentibus separa- according as

bilibus ac inseparabilibus; ut multe sunt species religio- distinguishcd

sorum et tamen omnes sunt eiusdem speciei substanci- ''Jss\°n7iaV"'r^

alis. ^", videtur michi quod species rnotus naturalis vel accidental. "^, ',, , ^ ,, ^ , What

4oessenciahs maxime attenditur penes matenam motus; principally

et per consequens penes per se terminum ad qiiem, cum ^ nfovement is

its proper and essential terminus.

10. mlti'' B. 20. phie B; //'. al^ B. 32. fa."'" B.

l6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

omnis talis sit eiusdem racionis cum materia primo Movements adquisita. Ex quo patet quod adquisicio materie, ascen- may thus he dendo vel descendendo, circulariter vel recte, naturaliter

essentially oi . ... ,. .

the same vel violente, licet principient motus disparium specierum ^'they^differ '^ P^^ accidens, non tamen species naturales. Et patet 5 accidentally. quomodo contingit motus esse eiusdem speciei naturalis et disparium specierum peraccidens; et contingit motus convenire ac differre 2^ plus vel minus de talibus spe- ciebus. Objecttons. gej obicitur, probando quod non sit possibile eam- 10

I. The same ^ . ^ . ^ .

sphere cannot dem speram moveri per totum ab onente in occidens, and^VesmYrd ^^ econtra. lam primo videtur, data possibilitate quod in its entirety; omnis orbis celestis movetur:quia si pars supra orizontem

tor while v. g. . '.^ ^ ^

the part above movetur ab occidente in oriens, sequens est quod pars turns easuvrrd ^'-'^ orizonte movetur econtra ab oriente in occidens: i5

the part below et econtra. Ergo totus orbis eque movetur 2^ partes must turn . ? . / ^

westward. versus oriens sicut versus occidens; et econtra.

horizons'^"^ 2°. Sicut qualibet pars orbis celestis oritur et

every part ot occidit continue respectu diversorum orizoncium : ereo

the sky is f . . '^

rising or non refert ponere ipsum moveri versus onentem aut 20 mattefs not" versus occidentem. Ymmo quilibet punctus est tantum wliether we pgi- instans oriens vel occidens; et cum nullus punctus

say it moves to ' . . . '^

the east or the attmget alium, sequitur quod oriens non movetur versus and^^husany occidens, quamvis oriens infinicies erit occidens. Qui- point is east Hbet ergo punctus in equinocciali, si movebitur versus 10

and west at the ^ K .^

same time. alium, contmue movebitur versus quemlibet alium; et East^novlr ^^^- continue movebitur versus occidens, versus meridiem, towards the qi quemlibet punctum equinoccialcm cuiuscunque diflFe-

West; which is ^. .^ . ^ . \

inadmissibie. rencie. Et illud sequitur ponendo istas dmerencias iixas. confusingto 3°- Quilibet punctus in celo preter 4°'' est orientalis, 3o say that occidentalis, borealis et australis: ergo, non est nisi

anything moves , . . 1 1 -i

towards a point contusio dicere quod mobile movetur versus talem since^^the^Nvitofe differenciam, cum non sit talis differencia fixa. Maior

si^y, except 4 probatur per hoc quod in relativis tenet consequencia

points is at ' ^ . , ^. ,. . , .... ,. .

once east, west, a comparativo ad simphciter; sed quihbet punctus ceh 3o

"°south." preter polum antarticum est in comparacione ad ipsum

For instance, borealis; ereo quilibet punctus preter ipsum est borealis. every point . ^ ,•• .... ., ,. ,

in the sliy, Et sic de 2) ahis punctis miciantibus 3^ alias plagas.

ant^aicuVpoie, ^^" ^"^go opponuntur terra borealis et australis, sed is more or less pocius relative convertibilia [suntl. 40

to the nortii. ^ L J f

4. pu'""' B. 28—29 <^9C? dne B. 35. 9» B. 36. ergo

vro est B. 40. sunt deest B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 17

4" plus accedendo ad mentes loquencium, videtur Nothiim quod nuUa spera inferior movetur versus oriens, quia to\vards'a"fixed est impossibile moveri aliquid continue versus tcr- poim moves

r I 1 • o- 'T^^a^' trom it;

B iod" minum nxum et re | ccdere contmue ab eodem. Sic tiius noiie of 5 enim contingeret muscam ascendere repente ab uno snlieres^movcs extremo lancee in aliud per hora, illa lancea 2'" se tota eastward.

, , , ^ , ' , . . ,., Otlierwise

descendente per eandem horam velocius m quanbet if a fly proporcione signabili; et sic motus ascensus et motus ^^73^06 that'' descensus contrarii inessent eidem subiecto primo. descended at

,. . ^. , . . , . the same time

10 5'' , sic. Si planeta motu proprio precise tam velociter the same being moveretur, sicut rapitur per orbem superiorem, tunc ^°"contrary ^'^ non moveretur: ereo multo magis nunc non movetur. movements.

^ . ^ . r ■ , 5"'. A planet

Antecedens patet, quia tunc continue roret m eodem does not movc loco; ergo non moveretur localiter. Si enim mobile spherc^doos^fn

i5 moveatur propter nisum suuin, non adquisita materia a contrary

^ ^ . , . , ? . sense; but if it

motus, tunc omnis lapis vel grave mixtum contmue did, it would

moveretur versus inferius. Sed quid incredibilius de "^"^y^"^'^

columpnis et aliis quiescentibus quam quod descendant There can be . ^ ' ^ no movement

COntmue.'' without changc

20 6'° sic: si motus remissior inpedit aliqualiter reliquum, 6^^ A^shywer

motus intensior plus impediret, et motus equalis sim- movement of

oncpflrt

pliciter impediret. Sed motus orbis planetarum impediret hindors the

motum raptus, cum longe velocior foret, illo subducto, mmxment

quam est modo. Ergo motus simpliciter pares sim- equally fast in ,. . . ,. „ , . ^ a contrarv

23 puciter se impedirent. Ergo multo magis motus raptus, scnse would

adeo velocior motu proprio inferioris orbis^ simpliciter ]>tif t^h^e/Zthc impedit illum. Quilibet enim planeta tanto cicius de- movemeut of

., . , . , ^ . llio planetary

scnberet circuium suum circa terram quam modo racit, sphere, being quantum est talis ortus porcionis circuli quem describit niu'st*de'strov to in die motu proprio sui deferentis: ut sol in anno so- it entirely.

, . „ . , . It so, Ihe sun

lari rrequencius quam modo circumrotaretur per unum ousht to

diem. Et alii planete per plus vel minus 2"^ propor- [he°oarth°one^ cionem velocitatis sui deferentis. Et hoc videtur mirabile d'iy oftener than

, ,,.,,,. it does ; so ot

multum, quod mobile multum velociter movetur versus the oiher

35 terminum fixum, et tamen, subducto illo motu, et quo- ''m'o'vem'ent''is"

cvmque supplente vicem eius, cicius veniente ad ter- destroyed.

. . . . Which seems

mmum suum quam modo faciet: ut sol in occidente astounding. existens cicius veniret ad terminum suum quam modo faciet; ut sol in occidente existens cicius \cniret ad ori- 40 zontem subducto proprio motu, cum per motum raptus

i5. adq'">' B. ifi. Ip B. 29. ts B. 3o. d'tnt^ B 33. d'fnt-P B. 34. multum in marg. B.

l8 .lOHANNlS WYCr.lF CAP. IX.

lluis thc quam moJo faciet. Non ergo habet illud racionem motus '''^ po^ver^ot'"" quod impedit eius subiectum adquirere eius materiam.

hindenng any -^q^, valet dicere quod descripcio concavitatis orbis planet trom . . ^ . . . . ^ .

actually superioris et non adquisicio situs sit motus localis orbis

T™say"fhat planete; quia talis descripcio non est motus^ sed acciden- 5 Jocal movement ^gjjl-gj. concomitatur motum; ut, si quis applicaret cul-

is merely . 1 1 • j 1

change of site tellum quiescentem ad lapidem molarem circumductum, °"sphere" not""^ quo usque tota superficies extima lapidis sit descripta,

real change of ig^\\v, descripcio non est motus. Ereo per idem nec retro- place, is talse. ..... j . '.

gradacio orbis mferions nec descnpcio sue concavitatis. 10 Generalansiver. p^-Q jgj-Q videtur michi quod logice neeandum est

Logically . ^ ^ ^

speaking, this tales motus esse. Equivalent tamen quo ad conclusiones

'^^moveme'iit. ^ astronomi et finem quem intendit de uno loco et opera-

But it is cione astri in ista inferiora ; sive ponatur talis nisus esse cquivalent, as . . ; .,

regards motus, sivenon; quia vensimile est quod quilibet orbiSi5

"the^re^iTa' planete habet nisum ut sit sub orbe signorum continue

tendency in dispariter suppositus, saltem 2^ 1 planetam suum : ex B io5''

each planct ' . . . ' . '

pass on to quo nisu defeccio supponitur, modo quo convenit celesti sign; it^^m^tters horologio. Aliter enim planete non possent diversimode littie whether gggg [yj. gipnis diversis celestibus, sicut experti sunt esse. 20

this bo called <=' . . . ^

movement Unde, sic ampliando motum, contmgit idem corpus If we extend habere quotlibet motus distinctos specifice; ut luna ihe mcamng dicitur habere quinque motus, preter duos motus com-

of movement, . ^ , . '^

we shall munes omnibu.s planetis, et quothbet alios motus con- actual^ change tingit ymaginari lunam habere in ymaginacione per 25

of place, diversos orbes motos super diversos polos. Istud tamen tendencv, .^ . ^ .

change bt non haberet colorem, si omnis motus sit mobile. Tunc position on a . -j j 1 -i • • ] ...

surface, emm videndo mobile moveri, non videretur nisi precise delay, &c. iHud quod videbatur, mobili quiescente-. quod contra-

dicit cuicunque sano iudicio. Extendendo ergo nomen 3o motus equivoce ad motum proprie dictum, ad materiam motus, et ad quemcunque modum habendi corporis propter quem ipsum aliter movetur, ut sunt nisus, descripciones, tardaciones, vel quomodocunque aliter vocentur: respondetur ad argumenta. 35

'■. T'"^ ^, Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est probabilis,

conclusion ot ' , . ^. ,. , .

ihis argument cum qualibet pars latitudinalis spere celestis mote se- every^part^^of quitur ad aliam^ et movetur versus oriens, occidens, et the celestial yersus meridiem : et sic de infinitibus sitibus. Verumptamen,

sphere moves . . ' '

towards aii the ymaginato quod est dare situs fixos, sive per totum 40 ''°compass^.''^ mundum, sive in ultima spera, ut maior pars sapientum

i5. quia pro quod B. 20. t'*'' B. 25. in ymaginacione in marff. B. ca''*' or ca'"' B.

CAr. IX. I.OGICA. 19

concesserat, et patet sequi ex dictis quomodo de loco liui lct ns vel situ est facile respondere. Nam celum 2"'' emispirium ''there^ai-c'''

supra orizontem nostrum movetur ab oriente in occidens ,. certain

■^ . . . . directions that

et 2"' emispenum sub onzonte nostro movetur ab occidente do not change.

3 in oriens e converso: et sicut idem ascendit ct descendit oi^r^part^olVhe

^™ partes, sic in proposito de motu ab oriente in sky turns

. o j 1 • towards the

occidens; et econtra. Sed notandum quod one)is quan- West, and the

doque sumitur pro illo situ inmobili in quo dextra pars "'^the^Eas^

celi creata est, et quandoque participialiter pro quo- ^^^ Orientmay ' ^ . ^ . ^. . ^ ' mean either

locunque quod respectu illius oritur; et sic occidens nwnc east or rising;

sumitur pro situ inmobili in quo sinistra pars mundi „,^^^ or^seTt^n"^

creata est, et quandoque participialiter, pro quocunque

quod occidit. Et ista equivocacione plurimum laboratur.

Nam notum est ymairinanti polos mundi et axem super 1' t'"^ world ^ . '^ ,• , , turned round

i5quem rotatur, quod alium modum movendi habet que- the other way,

libet pars orbis mota super orizontem nostrum, quam p!,^.[^\°Q^]j ,.i'5^

haberet movendo super eadem principia e converso; quia ,.""'^ set

,., ,. ^ . ,': . ^. ' ^ ditterentlv.

quelibet tahs pars oriretur nobis m situ quem vocamus

occidens, et paulative moveretur versus meridiem, quo-

20 usque advenerit ad situm quem vocamus oriens fixum.

Et proporcionaliter de partibus orbis motis sub orizonte.

Ideo philosophi, specificantes modum movendi celi 2^ Wc say ihat

partes sensui suo notas, ut sunt partes supra orizontem t^owar^cis"the^

nostrum, vere dicunt quod celum movetur ab oriente west; ihe

• j . , . ,. , , Antipodes

23 in occidens, et antipodes nostn vere dicerent quod celum wouid say ihc movetur econtra a situ quem nos vocamus occidens ad ^vhar\7c' cah'

situm quem nos vocamus oriens; sed situs qui est nobis "l? ^^'^^^ \^ tlic ., ^ ,. .... . ' . , .^ • ,• East to them.

occidens diceretur hus oriens: et sic de situ onentah. Thus in both Ideo utrobiquemovetur celum versus occidensrespectivum. '^''^'^^n-10'ves^" '

B 106" Unde non obest illud | quod ultimo concluditur. Ahter i^^spcctlvcly .,,. . . „ towards ihe

tamen locuntur ilh qui ponunt tales situs fixos, et West. onerosius ac brigosius illis qui negant tales situs.

Ad 2^ dicitur quod argumentum est verum, cum 2. It is true

quelibet pars orbis celestis corporee magna oritur et of thc^sky^^fs'^

35 occidit 2™ partes respectu diversorum. Et sic est tam nsing and

■ I /• 11- :. ■ • • ,• \ setting for

oriens quam occidens (intelligendo participiahterj; et different sic quilibet punctus oriens continue erit oriens vel [^yt '|ie'i.^°0^.j(.,.,( occidens, quia continue novo ortu et occassu instantaneo ,^"'^ Occident

: . . . . havc tlie sense

respectu diversorum onzoncium. Et sic ortus successivus of participles.

40 componetur ex instantaneis. Nec sequitur ex argumento

g. _ptici' B. 14. notuj B. : ib. ymagi'' B. 17. p'n' B.

20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

Wc havc consesso conclusio deducta; quia, ut dictum est, in-

postahfted^that telligitur quod pars celi supra orizontem nostrum mo-

whatever is yetur versus occidens; quod est verum. Unde credo

above our . ' . . ....

horizon moves quod est dare onens et occidens inmobue, ni quorum AnYl^a^dmit a pi"imo astra habent ampliorem efficaciam,tanquam partes 5 fixed Eastern dextere, et in 2"^ habenl efficaciam quasi partes sinistre:

and a Western . ' . . \ ^ tt i

sphere, in each sicut et signa et astra appropnata ilhs partibus. Unde

°strrs'have'^ Aries, quorsumcunque volvatur, est in dextera parte ceU,

pecuHar g^ Libra in parte sinistra. Et sic conceditur quod qui-

etficacy. . ^ . .... . ^ ^

Aries wi!i tluis hbet punctus m equmocciah movetur contmue versus lo

the Ers^t^^and quemhbet aHum. Nec frustra, etsi nunquam attingat

L/fcra in the iHum : quia non hoc intenditur. Sicut ergo unus in-

Thus every sequens ahum movetur versus eum, sed non contra

Zod/ac"mov^es eum, sic est de punctis equinocciahs, qui moventur ut

towards every ponitur. Nec sequitur, si quihbet ihorum punctorum i5 othcr, but never 1^ . ^ ^ ,.

to meet; movetur reciproce versus quemcunque rehcum, quod

°'^move in°a"° moventur contra se; quia solum mota motibus con- contrary trariis versus eumdem situm moventur contra se: ut A

direction, /-■ •

as two bodies et B, mota super eamdem hneam rectam versus C situm,

"straighHine vel super Hneas rectas angulariter concurrentes ad G 20

towards cach gitum. Tales enim motus sunt incomplete contrarii. Nec other. . '.

It is on video quomodo ahud msequens rehquum et nunquam account of this ... • . • • • •.. j

movement that sibi appropmquans movetur versus ipsum, nisi sit dare

we must situs fixos, locantes mota quibus sit sic appropinquacio.

directions. Non tamen dicitur quod idem C movetur versus C vel 25

situm in quo est, quamvis inmediate ante hoc movebatur

versus illum situm, et inmediate post hoc sic movebitur:

quia nichil movetur versus aUud locaUter, nisi a quo

, ~. distat. Unde probabile est dicere quod aUquid movetur

consequence is versus aUud per Uneam obUquam, attamen recedit ab 3o

^ ^^ fixcd "" eodem dum per tempus fiet continue distancius etc.

directions; 10 p^^ ,m dicitur quod consequencia non valet. Unde

say they are ■^ t ■ n • •

impossibie, but concedo tales esse differencias fixas. Nec dubmm qum

^equivalTnt, is^ i^egantes tales esse differencias, sed [admittentes] quod

absurd. equivalet ac si tales essent, intricabunt seipsos, cum 35

almost tho nichil potest equivalere impossibih. Et sic conceditur

beTongs to^all quod quiUbet punctus in celo, preter aUquem 4°'" nomi-

the four pomts natorum est austraUs, boreaUs, orientaUs, et occidentaUs; of the compass ^ . .

at once. ut ta"ngitur in argumento.

s^amemot^ion Ad 4™ negatur argumentum; quia non solum per 40 may approach diyersos motus, sed per eundem, contingit aUquid movere

I. dcd'la B. 34. admittentes decsl.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 2 1

versus terminum fixum et recedere ab eodem, ut dictum to and recede

TVT • 1 • ^ j j .1. from a aoal at

est proximo. Nec video quin, extendendo nomen motus the same time. (ut dictum est), concederetur quod musca moveretur ■^"'^' '" '^e

^ '' ~ , . . case put, tne

contra lanceam ; non tamen ascendit. Ideo illi motus fly does not

r ^ -1 •, ^ ..•••.... indeed ascend

5 sunt compossibues, et non contrarn; sicut sunt ascensus, t^e lance, since et descensus. Ascensus enim dicit adquisicionem supe- ^^^^ means

... 1 . ... :ncrease ot

R loG'' rioritatis, et descensus adquisicionem inferiontatis, que distance from

^ • 1 • • 1 u- ^ • .. tlie centre;

repugnat simul messe eidem subiecto primo et per se. b^t jt jnay be

Nota tamen quod motum repcionis consequuntur multi ^aid to move ^ . ^ ^ against it.

lo motus, et multe quietes organorum. Ideo motus contra The movemcnt

d.. • .. r ..1 4.* of crawline is

ociter contrane motam non [estj continue madeupof

precise in eodem situ. Unde differt motus musce contra "■'^"X motions

'^ .... . . and rcsts.

lanceam a motu orbis infenoris contra supenorem in The movement hoc quod alter primorum est violentus, sed neuter 2"""" v°iole'nt, i^' e!

i5motuum est violentus. Ymmo uterque illorum motuum ag^inst gravuy;

. ^ . . . that ot the

est per totum subiectum suum eiusdem racionis, et sic inferior sphere

non est de motu animalis repentis vei quomodolibet A^a^n the moventis se contra suum deferens; quia partes eiusdem movement of

' ^ ^ hotii spheres is

diversimode movebantur. Unde, ad cognoscendum ge- of jil^e nature; 20 neraliter motus contrarios, satis est quod sicut motus ^^^ °ance is^ eiusdem generis propinqui, quorum species possunt suc- not so. cessive inesse eidem subiecto primo et per se; sed movements are repugnat quod simul sic insint. De motibus autem in- ^coexi^t hi""]" dividuis non est cura. Unde, 2™ Aristotelem, illi motus same subject.

' . Thcy take

25 causantur penes terminos ad quos vel termmos versus piace where quod contrarios. Q^uamvis enim Sor motus versus borream, are'contrai"y et Plato, sibi obvians, movendo contrarie versus austrum, 'o e^ch othcr. moveantur ad eundem terminum, moventur sibi sub differencias fixas contrarias. Ideo dicuntur motus con-

Sotrarii; sicut Aristoteles vocat ventos contrarios qui moventur differenter super eandem dyametrum ad diffe- rencias oppositas. Nec obest quantumcunque locum Every place distantem a reliquo esse sibi contrarium, quamvis sit another p^iace quantitas; quia eeneralis racio formarum est quod sint '^ contrary, in

'. . ^ . so rar as the

35 eiusdem genens propinqui qui non possunt sutiuI et same body

semel, sed successive, adquiri eidem subiecto primo. '^both°at the

Et sic omnia privative opposita vocat Aristoteles con- same time.

traria, quia sunt forme eiusdem generis, una per se et They are

alia per reduccionem, qui mutuo se cxpellunt; et sic ^^Jj^y^^^^^y^^^f'

40 contrariantur quecunque loca distancia. Aliquando autem exclude one . . . ^ . . ancther.

rcstrmgitur contrarietas formarum ad racionem contrarie

9. r'pcois B. II. no or ao B; ib. est deest B. 3i. duce' = du-

pliciter? jpro difterenter B.

22 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

activitatis. Et talis non inest quantitatibus, cum non sint de genere activorum. Loca autem, quamvis non denominent formaliter corpora individua locari, sed communia, tamen denominant efficienter corpora in- dividua locari, causando ubicaciones formaliter denomi- 5 There is aii nantes. Multiplicatum ergo potest simul esse in locis

cxception for ^ •• • ^ ^ i • i- ,^

multipliable contrarus, sicut etcorporeum non multiplicatum 2'^ partes.

■ilso^tbf^mat^er ^^'^ nichil potest simul et seinel per se et primo esse that can be in locis contrariis. Et ex istis patet quod saeitta mota partialiv in »....•■ ri • • • 1

dirterent piaces; i"ecte et vertigme movetur 2^^ motu in specie simul, 10

'"'■'inTat^^he"'^ 'l"^^ motus rectus contrariatur ei qui est econtra ad same timc. differenciam oppositam, et non illa circumduccio, sicut

patet ex descripcione motuum contrariorum superius

posita. argument^^Ls not ^'^ S'" negatur argumentum. Nec sequitur mobile i5 good. Because non moveri localiter, etsi maneat continue in eodem

therc is no • . , ,

movement, i. e. situ ; quia preter motum localem quem consequitur

'^'^^'^'does not'^''' ^^^q^-^sicio et deperdicio situs, est dare alium qui est lollow that limitacio passiva ad intendum versus aliam differenciam,

there is no ■ .... , . . .

movement, i. e. ^ive mobue quiescat localiter, sive non ; et tali motu 20 m^ove^^^^vhether 1^°^'^'^'-"" l^pis et quodlibet grave violentatum a situ there is or is quem appetit continue versus deorsum. Nec est talis

not chanee of . ^ . , ., ., , .,

place. motus univoce velox cum motibus ponentibus mobile rnovenient has ^PPi^opinquare fixo, sicut sunt ascensus et descensus ; not the same sicut forle non sunt univoce motus cum illis. Et cum 25

signitication .... . .

as 'ascent'; tot modis dicttur unum oppositorum quot modis et

hav'e^the same- ^'^^^'5^^^™' patet quod est dare quietes tot modis dictas

and there are' istis motibus oppositas [ Undc, sicut stat idem alterari B 107°

many sorts as ct quiescere localiter et econtra, sic stat idem per to-

m'ovemems ^^^ moveri localiter et quiescere localiter multis motibus 3o

et multis quietibus, sed non oppositis.

^'imply'^no°' Unde falsum est quod qiiiescere includit negacionem

movement at omnis motus a quiescente, cum sufficit ad quietem all, but it .... , . ^ . • ,■ •

denies one sort mobilis quod ipsum natum sit moven tali specie motus a^cenafn^Ume^^^ P'-^ tempore pro quo non movetur illa specie: ut, si 35

if the earth terra naturaliter pure descendit in vacuo vel medio were simply to ,., , . . -

desccnd, it quocunque quantumhbet velociter, tunc ipsa perrecte

from^^aH 'o°thcr ^^^isscit a motu circulari vel motu violento contrario. movcmcnts. Et sic, si corpus movetur, tunc quiescit, et non proprie

It any body ^ x ? r r

moves,' it rests, buf not vice versa.

(). mlti'" B. 17. q, B. 23. v''° B. 25. v''» B.

3q. Tiinc quiescit. Because it lias not all possible movements.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 23

e converso, cum deus potest servare semper corpus a

motu proprio, sicut potest movere celum motu despari,

et facere ipsum per totum quiescere. Ex quo patet

quod quies est naturaliter prior motu tali, cum sit eius

5 perfeccio, gracia cuius habendi est actus ille incompletus,

quo usque veniatur ad motum perfectum. Nec oportet We must

,...,. . , . neitlicr admit

credere opmioni wulgari, neganti tales motus; quia

wulgus non concipit motum et quietem nisi localem,

propter faaiositatem. Unde laicus negaret tale alteratum

lovel augmentatum, et quietem localiter moveri; nec per-

cipit quod alteracio et alteracio sunt species motus

Sentencia ergo wulgi est vera, cum sit naturaliter inna- nor dcny as

.,,. . " ' ,. ,. , ., , . false the

tum illis sic cognoscere; sed aliter ampuant philosophi common terminos motus quam plebei. Nec omnes philosophi ex- °J^'mi'ts'o'!i'v'^ I S tendunt nomen motus ad tantum ut iam extenditur, change ot piace

, , .,,.... , . to bo

sed solum ilh qui mnituntur salvare motus propnos movement;

nlanptarnm t'i'^ lcarned and

pianetaiura. ^ ^l^^ unlearncd

Unde Alpetragius, negans tales motus, putando sal- nse the word

. . , . in a diftcrent

vare omnes expenencias per unum motum ab oriente sensc. 20 in occidens, sed quod orbes inferiores tardantur, racione '^'■'^i^on^that cuius retardacionis fiunt coniuncciones et opposiciones denies that the

.,..,. . , , , phuicts have

incidit m hoc inconveniens quod omnes planete de- a,iy movement scriberent orbes parallelos nolis mundi; et sic planete pf t''"'" °wi;

y _ ' ' i but arc merely

non moverentur in circulo obliquo, causando estatem slower than the

, ,. . ,. , superior sphere.

2? et hyemem, echpses et generaciones tah modo quo But this wiii experiencia docet fieri ab iUis; quia motu primi mobihs, fifi.^tiien^liie

quantum in se est, non reciperetur 2'^^ circuktm non planets would ,, , ,. ,. , . , . describe orbits

paraiielum poiis mundi, sed motus partis orbis super parallei with

polos declinantes a polo mundi, facit illam partem ^'f r'^'^"'^^?'^'^'?^'^

^ _ . -t ' -^ . obhque, as they

"o declinare ab austro in boream, et econtra. Ut, ymagi- .do.

- ... For insttincG

nato quod sol nunc sit sub equinocciah, et solum the sun, being moveatur raptu primi mobihs, non est racio assignanda '" Vea' e' tTic"''^ quo unquam declinabit ab equinocciah; sed quandoque ecliptic and not

f..i.u jTu.. • .. ^ return to it

ioret soi extra quodlibet 12 signorum; ut per tempus until the next •^3 totum quo exierit a Libra quo usque redeat ad Libram. ycar at the

^ . same time.

Et hoc certum est recte ymaginanti.

18. alpetgig B. 35. jitc" pro per lempus totum B.

18. I can find no natne at all answering to Alpetragius. There is, however, a certain Alb)'icus, who died in 1220, accord- ing to Franklin's Dictionary. — Some words are probably wanting in this sentence; but as the sense is clear enough, it may be merely an ellipse.

24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

\Ve should, Melius ergo est extendere nomen motus ad omnem

therefore, call ,. . . • u \- ■ ■ i- v

movcmcnt limitacionem passivam ab alio; racione cuius liraita-

every changc cionis dispariter se habet quo ad situm, qualitative

produccd m / . . ^ . . ^ . . ,

one body by vel quantitative. Et isto modo dicunt philosophi mtel-

another, whibh ,. . -tn^ ^ ^ j ■ j ,. -

makes it in any ligencias moveri a Deo, tanquam amato et desiderato, 3

way to difter ^j movendum active suos orbes: quod si non facerent,

from what it . . ^ '

was. cum veris paribus que iam ponuntur, dependerent de

that ' bonitate accidentali, displicendo Deo. Et breviter omnis

'inteliigences' creatura movetur sic a Deo, saltem per tempus, in- are moved by . . ' . ^ . ^ .

God to give veterascendo, perficiendo in bonitate accidentali, vel lo motion to their , n • i ^^i- ^ j- ..u-i l-

spheres. dehciendo; et tali motu dicunt philosophi omne movens

So are all phisicum communicans in materia cum suo motu

creatures -r _

moved by God, quod tangit in movendo, moveri; quia non dubium in every change . i i • j u-i-^ ^ • j ^ • n h

that they qum omne tale | contmue debilitatur m agendo, et sicBioy"

undergo. continue deperdit qualitatem. Non tamen oportet i5

In this sense .... . . .

it is said that quod intelligencia, ut sic, adquirat continue successive

'^moved by the qualitatem. Nec oportet quod calidum calefaciendo

mobilc it frigefiat 2"'' aliquam eius partem ; nec oportet motum

incxlon changes ah obiecto adquirere continue successive aliam quali-

it, diminishing ^ ^ , cn ■^ j i- •» .. u -n j -j *

its power. tatem ; sed sufricit quod Iimitetur ab illo ad accident- 20 aliter eliciendum actum vel servandum, racione cuius est melius vel peius, vel aliter denominatum quo ad acquirendum 3'" gradum materie motus quam foret subducto limitante ad taliter apprehendendum. Yet tliere is no Unde vane ponunt aliqui actus anime esse qualitates, 25 the agent to propter hoc quod ad illas est motus. Ad illos enim an^y^n^ew non est motus tanquam ad per se terminos, quamvis

quality; it is necessario omne elicitivum actus sit mobile, sicut nec enough that it . . '

is determined est motus ad movere mtellective; nec moverentur talia

to^p^roduce proprie, sed extensive, loquendo de motu. Quod patet 3o or redintegrate g^ Yioc quod coenitivum movetur continue ab obiecto,

an act. . . ...

There is a dum non continue noviter recipit speciem vel actum ab

movement in . , ^ ^

tiie mind tliat eo. Ideo motus quo movetur est permanens, et non

elicits its acts, consistit in successione, quamvis, pro illo instanti quo but they are . . ' ^ ' } . , . ., .

not on that intendit elicere actum, vel generabit speciem vel servabit 35

account . i 1 ■ • ^ i j ..

qualities. speciem aut habitum prius receptum. Ideo tunc ince- "^^® , perunt tam motus instantaneus quam permanens. Unde,

movcmcnt — i t. r '

either of generation or

redintegration 7- ^'"'* ^- ^-- movcrit in ma>g. B. 35. cpit in marg. B ; ib.

gna' B.

35. Servabit. I have used the word redintegrate, because Wyclif seems to allude to an idea that, by a given act, is not generated but merely recalled, or as the moderns would say, redintegrated, though the sense is perhaps somewhat different.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 25

cum non sit possibile talem actum elicitum esse nisi — cxists oniy

vel generetur vel servetur qualitas illo actu, non mirum instant whcn si auctores dicunt omne elicitivum actus esse mobile is"endtcd (subaudi motu communiter dicto, et non motu proprie 5 dicto).

Et si queratur de velocitate talium motuum, dicitur !t may be

, ,. . , , askcd: What is

quod aliqui sunt non veloces cum sunt permanentes, thc rapidity of

et alii successivi sunt veloces; quod mensuratur com- tayicn^^in^this

muniter penes iineas vel materias quas adquirent sua scnse? ,.,._„.,, . .,,- • Some have no

lomobilia. 2™ illos motus, si moverentur, iUis non impe- swittness, ditis. Sed videtur michi quod pari evidencia omne "*'a^i'd thts '^ ' mobile violentatum continue existendo in eodem situ swiitness is

, , . , . , mcasnred bv

multum velociter moveretur et breviter, quod omne thc space thcy mobile eque velociter moveretur sicut posset moveri in d^^.Q^^ni^J ^j^f '^fot iSvacuo vel in pleno, cum omnibus aliis sequentibus ex hiiidcicd.

• • TVT • A r. • nir. ^ ]• • •^^ Liodv that is

istis. Nam si A motum contra B in 2>'° tardius ipso keptln the

B, intendatur motum suum quousque moveatur in 2P'° ^a^cafnrt'^its velocius ipso B uniformiter moto, pro instanti medio natural

, .^ 1 •. T-. .. ^ ..• j tendcncy is tluis

movebitur eque velociter cum B; et tunc, continuando in movement, 20 illum eradum motus, non mutaret situm suum. Gum for it wouid

" ... . move taster

ergo omne mobile naturale impeditur ne tam velociter and faster

^ ^ • 1 .. ] • 1 •.. were tiiere 110

moveat se sicut potest, videtur quod sic velociter mo- impcdiment. vetur cum impeditum non impedit a velocitate motus, ut dicit responsio. Ideo videtur michi probabile quod 25 tales motus locales versus aliquos terminos fixos per quos non acceditur appropinquando illis, non sunt veloces, quamvis per accidens taliter sint spacia illis descripta.

Ad 6"^ dicitur quod stat motus impedire se mutuo G. Diffcrent

, rr .. .. • ^ ..•. 1 cocxistcnt

3o quo ad enectus extrmsecos, causatos a motibus, sed movcmcnts non quo ad velocitatem vel tarditatem illorum mo- ""'3' •mider

T . ... tlic external

B 108* tuum; | quia, quocunque motu signato, si foret velocior cifects caused

vel tardior, tunc non roret idem motus in numero, eo thcir respectivc

quod vel variaretur m.ateria motus, vel tempus, vel t,^?!''^"'!^^' T ... II t'icy did,

35 utrumque. Et per consequens non impedirct vel im- they would no j. . ,, loriger be the

pediretur; quia non esset. Motus tamen communes same

possunt se mutus impedire. Unde, pro materia ai-gu- "''o^cnifints, but menti, videtur michi quod non propter equales motus if the sun

,.^ , ., • TT.. • . went hackwards

contra se impeditur mobile moven. Ut, ymagmato as fast as its 40 quod sol jnnitatur moveri tantum motu proprio, quantum orbis rapiens nititur movere ipsum contra

i3. b" B.

26 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

sphere went occidens, ita quod per A tempus sit in meridiano

would"remain nostro ; ego non video quin uterque illorum foret mo-

seemingly tus: sed non uterque velox vel tardus, quamvis valde

motionless. , . ... ... , . .

Both sphcre celeriter descnberetur circulus in orbe supenori utroque ^"ove^^bu^t^we^ istorum. Motus tamen proprio moveretur sol velociter 3 could'not cali ab austro in boream, vel econtra. Ideo dicunt aliqui

that movement ..... .

properly swift. quod non est possibile orbem inrenorem moveri contra

\^"\d^move superiorem super eosdem polos, ita quod continue

from north to rnaneat idem punctus in eodem situ, et motus continue

south with an . th j ^ i ^ • u- j »

apparent Jocaliter. Illud tamen non placet micni, eo quod tunc lo S^rrie^d^env diceretur sol habere motum ab austro in boream, vel

that movement econtra, et non ab occidente in oriens. Videtur ergo

is possible in a . ... , ...

contrary quod motus, qui est passio, sit pnor quocunque mobiii,

directiOTjo thc q^^^j^ motus formaliter successivus, qui est velox vel

But then the tardus ; quia si aliquid movetur illo motu, ipsum limi- i5

sun would have . ... . . , ^-^ ..

a real tatur et patitur se taliter denominan quo ad quantitatem so°utirto"north' ^'^^ qualitatem ; et non econtra.

not from west iJeo non est concedendurn quod iste motus, qui iam \Vc cannot est velox, erit non velox per eius intensionem; vel

admit that a gcontra motus non velox erit velox; quia isti motus 20 movement _ ' ~

having a sunt diversorum racionem, cum totum genus unius

certain rapidity . ,. t-.-^-i^ •!.•

would, if more presupponit totum genus altenus. Et ita videtur micni intense, have qyod, sicut motus qui est nisus ab oriente in occidens

none. t. ; ....

Thus L think contrariatur nisui ab occidente in oriens, sic motus

that castward . , ■ ^ ■ ., ^ ■ . . ■ .

and westward successivus ab oriente m occidens contranatur motui 20

tendencics successivo Dossibili qui dicit formaliter adquisicionem.

contradict cacli r t _ t _

othcr. Ymaginabile tamen est motus circulares esse, qui si

And wc can . . , . ^ •• c„^

fancv circular possent successive messe celo, essent contrani. bed moiions ihat ^^1}^ ggx motuum localium rectorum est motus circu-

would be ....

conirarv if thcy laris contrarius; ut non ascensui vel descensioni, cuius- 3o

existecl in the ,. u • .. .. ^ „^„

sky; but nonc modi sunt motus a borea m austrum, et econtra; nec of the six motui recto a dextro in sinistrum vel econtra, ut sunt

movcments — ... .

asccnsion, motus ab oriente in occidens, et econtra; ut motui arrcontraiy" recto ab ante ad retro et econtra, ut motus a principio

to ihe circuiar Q^j^^j,j[ versus Capricornum, vel econtra; eo quod 35 movement. ^- ? _ ■> ^

quilibet istorum motuum compatitur secum per totum motum circularem; et sic de motibus circularibus compacientibus se in eodem subiecto, dum non directe fuerit versus differencias oppositas.

One thing is Sufficit ergo philosopho quod celuiTi per totum sit^o

ccrtain; in thc exemptum ab omni violencia; ex quo verisimile est sky tliere is ' .... . .

nothing violent. quod tam orbis inferior quam orbis superior descnberet

tam celeriter circulum sicut modo, subducto alterutro

illorum motuum Ideo non est de illis, sicut est in casu

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 27

Zenonis, in quo ponitur spacium recte moveri contra

mobile motum.

Ulterius concediturquod sol[motus]motu proprio versus We may admit

oriens, tardatur attingere oriens; et sic de aliis mirabi- ^ movfng""'

B loS'' libus conclusionibus sequentibus. 1 Si tamen motuproprie castwards by

' '. \ ^ its own

dicto precise moveretur versus onens, tunc non sic tar- movement,

daretur; quia moveretur 2™ aliam porcionem circuli reaciiin^^^Uic

versus oriens. ="st; and so

Ulterius conceditur quod descripcio talis non est Also that the

10 motus, sed unum accidentaiiter habens motum. Nec qJj ti^e ceTeVtial

quelibet adquisicio situs est motus, cum stat aliquod sphere is not ^ / . . . ^ movement, but

subito adquirere vel deperdere situm per contmuacionem a thing that vel discontinuacionem partis quantitative; ut patet de movcs. augmentato vel diminuto, de multiplicato, vel de de- i5 multiplicato. Motus ergo qui est limitacio passiva etc. Movcmcnt so est passio: sed motus formaliter successivus et velox lar as it is

. . . . passive, is a

videtur michi non esse passio ; sed motus accidentis passion; not passionis, ut motus localis proprie dictus dicit suum "lctual^^changV mobile. vel aliam partem primo moveri localiter, et , P^ p'^"-,

^ II- - . it implies that

20 per consequens ipsum, vel aliquam eius partem prius the subject or

fuisse in situ in quo post non est per successivam et oc^cuVics a

parcialem situs adquisicionem^ ad quam sequitur ad- P''^" "'^' ^^

quisicio ubicacionis. Ideo dicit commentator quod com- occupy betorc.

•. ^^- cc ••u .. !*• ■■ Avcrrlioes savs

ponitur ex multis arnrmacionibus et multis negacioni- that it is made 25bus: quia tales presupponuntur adesse tanquam prin- up of many

..'^ ^ .. ^ '. atfirmations

cipiantes, sed non quantitative componentes, cum sit and ncgations. forma simplex.

Sed diligenter notandum quod motus quandoque 'JVIovement' is

sumitur agregative pro multis motibus agregatis, eciam co^lic"aive"°and

3o discontinuis, vel quo ad tempus vel quo ad subiectum : mcans many

.... ... . movements;

sive smt unms speciei, sive sint dispanum specierum:

et illo modo dictum est progressionem esse motum

compositum. Quandoque autem sumitur simpliciter pro sometimcs it

motu cuius quelibet pars divisibilis vere continuatur moveme^nt of

35 cum reliqua et est eiusdem racionis, ut motus puncti which each . . ,. _ . . part is a

in equmocciah. Prnno modo est augmentacio motus, sequel to the

et forte omnis motus citra velocissimum. otiei.

Tercio principaliter dividitur motus2'^ suas passiones, Movement

racione temporis mensiirantis; ut aliquis est uniformis unfform^or

40 et aliquis difformis; et uterque subdividitur quo ad varied;

, . , ' ^ , , . umtorm in its

suDiectum et quo ad tempus. duo ad subiectum est subject if each

part of the

3. motus deest B. 3g. conformis B.

2 8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

thing moved motus uniformis, quando quelibet pars eius quantitativa

^'^vciocity ; ' quo ad molem est eque velox sicut aliqua talis, sicut est

de motu lineari per equinoccialem circulum subiectato.

varied in its Et dicitur difformis quo ad subiectum, quando una

^"^'^t^^moveT^ ^^"^ pars quantitativa 2™ molem est reliqua tali velocior, 5

taster; ut est dc motu colubri. Dicitur autem motus uniformis

uniform as to , ^ , i-i ^ ^•.. ^-

time, if tlie C[uo ad tcmpus, quando quelibet pars quantitativa quo velocity is tiie g^j successionem, que non est pars quo ad molem, est

samc at every J ^ . . ^ . .

part of time; eque velox ut aliqua talis; sicut est de toto motu primi velocity is celi. Sed diflformis dicitur quo ad tempus, quando una 10 greater^oMess^ ^^™P°i'i^ pars successiva est reliqua parte successiva

parts of time. subiecti primo moti velocior; ut motus naturales gravium These temporal et levium, qui vclocitantur in fine. Omne autem suc- and quantitative ^ggg-yyj^ extensum habet 2^^^® partes quantitativas, sicut

parts are equal . . . ^ ^ '

to the whole ^'^'^"^ quantitatem; scilicet quo ad molem et quo ad.i5

but the ttrst are tempus. Et conveniunt iste partes in hoc quod utraque

equai in subiective, qua pars, est minor suo toto; ut medietas quantity, and ) 1 r ' _ _ 5 _

the second in successiva motus est par toti motui et toti subiecto

duration. m 1 ^ ^ tl .. .. m

2"' molem, et quantumlibet parva pars motus 2™ mo- lem est equalis toti motui quo ad duracionem; et sic 20 iste equalitates et inequalitates dicunter equivoce. A humblc Humilis tamen logicus, non | querens apparenciam B log*

grfnT^hat^tlTc sophisticam, concederet quod infinitum parva pai*s part is equal to qyg^jj^j^gj.jyg motus et suum totum sunt equalia, et tamen

and yet lcss ^ .......

than the whole. totum illud est quantumlibet maius sua illa parte. Unde, 25 to call temporal propter istas equivocas magnitudines distingwendas, parts duration, yocatur una pars quo ad successionem vel diuturni-

and . ^ ^. . .

quantitative, tatem : et eius magnitudo vocatur diuturnitas. Et alia

magni u c. yocatur pars quo ad molem; et eius magnitudo propter

Magnitude, famositatem vocatur simpliciter magnitudo motus. Magni- 3o it not restrictcd ^ , • ..•.. ^\^ t^ • ■.. j- •

to quantity, tudo enmi competit methaphorice magnitudmi corporee,

miglit.be sicut multitudo convenit numero. Aliter enim dicit

inconvcniently ...

applied to time. habens hoc pro mconvenienti palam sequi quod quelibet movement^nay pars celi, eciam indivisibilis, esset quantumlibet magna, be unitorm and qyjj^ durative equalis suo toti: quod equivocans sine 35

varied rrom ^ ^ . .

difFcrent points inconvenienti concederet. Patet eciam quod motus uni- the niovcTncn\ formis est quantumlibet difformis, et e converso. Nam

of thc sky and motus celi est uniformis, quo ad tempus, et diflformis a falliiig stone. . ' ^ . . „ .

Another quo ad subiectum, et motus gravis est difllormis quo division of , .^ ^ t • j 1 • »

varied ^^ tempus et unitormis quo ad subiectum. 40

movcments: ggj motuum difformium est ulterior divisio. Nam

aj tou/oimly . . .„ .

aliquis est uniformiter diflformis, et alius diflformiter

6. coluri 13. 17. y"- B. 29. z pro est B.

CAP. tX. I.OGICA. 29

ditformis. Et hoc dupliciter: vel quo ad subiectum, vel and h) wrn^/Vj

ad tempus. Dicitur autem motus uniformiter difFormis ThiVtoois

quo ad subiectum, quando cuiuslibet partis sue quan- '^"!?^''/^^,

. . ^ . . . ^ . rcgards (i) tlic

titative quo ad molem gradus intensissimus tante excedit Vubjcct or

5 gradum eius medium, quante alicuius talis partis equalis aj (\) hfs"

eradus intensissimus excedit gradum eius medium. Et uintormlv c» . . . . ^^ . . vaned 111 inc

talis motus simpliciter uniformiter difformes non mo- subject ;

ventur nisi lineariter. Nam mota spera, centro eius citbcr

i'L ^ ■ -j » • ... absolutely, as

quiescente, quelibet eius semidyameter sic moveretur: the diamctcr of 10 sed de qualibet linea secante dyametros difformiter ^ umtormly

.... revolving

mota foret falsum quod uniformiter diffortniter move- sphcrc; retur. Et cum motus corporum secuntur in velocitate motus suarum linearum et superficierum, patet quod partes quantitative talium sperarutn obliquate valde

1 5 diversificantur in difformitatibus suorum motuum. Est ergo corpus dare uniformiter difformiter motum 2™ quid, quando cuiuslibet sue partis quantitative gradus inten- sissitnus tantum excedit gradum eius medium quante alicuius sue partis equalis et simillime in figura et or partially, as

20 posicione gradus intensissimus excedit gradum eius whicli ccrtain medium: cuiusmodi sunt corpora quorum partes lineares ''"*:!* "''°^''^ uniformiter difformiter moventur. Sed uniformiter diffor- (2) Uniformly mis motus quo ad tempus est cuius cuiuslibet partis ^'^'when"thV'^' quantitative quo ad successionem gradus eius intensissi- highest

^ ^ ." . exceeds tho

2.T mus tarite excederet graduin eius medium, quante mcan vclocity

,•••... !• ^- ^" 1 • i • ^ • • ^•..as mucli in oiic

aiicuius tahs partis equalis gradus intenstssimus excedit qaantitativc

gradum eius medium. Est autem motus difformiter P'""^ '''f '" "")'

•rr ■ • ■ rr • oiher.

difformis quo ad subiectum vel tempus motus difformis

cuius difformitas est diffortnis. Potest autem dici quod bj (i) Variably

3o motus difformiter difformis, tam quo ad subiectum subjcct; (2) in

quam quo ad tempus, est dupliciter; vel sic quod t'"""^-

quehbet eius pars quantitativa continue magna sit dif- Hcrc thcic can

B 109'' formis, vel sic quod quothbet eius partes sint | difformes; modes of

et hoc contineit infinitis modis variari. Et sicut ex variation; ^ and new

33 parte motus quo ad molem, et parte motus quo ad species ot

. , c • ... ... • "... movcment can

tempus potest neri pars motus ex utnsque composita, bc found

ita ex motu difformi quo ad tempus et motu difformi mdehmtely. quo ad subiectum et quo ad tempus; et ita mixtim in aliis divisionibus.

40 Sed ista dicta consecuntur tria dubia hic breviter Three

pertractanda. Primum, Si possibile est motum vel tale 'Juesions.

19. filime B.

30 JOIIANNIS WYCJ.IK CAP. IX.

I. wiil bc dcali succcssivum csse. 2"'' : Si continuum componitur ex non

with iii tlic ^- _ m i-i • j u ir ^ ^ 1 -^

iiext cliapter. quantis, et 3''' : Fenes quid ab eiiectu possunt regulariter attendi velocitates motuum. Primum tangetur proximo capitulo^ supponendo talia successiva esse et ampliando verba de presenti, quantum oportet, loquendo de suc- 5 cessivis.

Question II: Pro 2° argumentatur de punctis que requiruntur contiuuniis ^d esse linee, tanquam priores naturaliter toto genere

quaniity is linee. Ergo sunt cause linee, et non extrinsece: ereo

mcide up oj , " ' . .

points. ' intrinsece et per consequens partes. Aliter enim omnes lo naturaHVpdor pai"tes illius continui forent divisibiles; et tamen non

to lincs; so haberent partes nec partem, ut prius deductum est, Et tliey cause . '^ .

thcm, and sic concludendum esset quod iste partes componunt inlrinsicaliy ; so ^ ^ ■ ^ ^ • ^ ^ •

ilicy are paris '^^ causant se ipsas, et sunt pnores et postenores

ot thc lincs. 2™ infinitos gradus quam ipsemet sunt. Nec valet dicere i5

As thc instant quod non omnia sunt danda^ ut alibi dictum est; nec

'*oV timolnd '^ ^st maior racio quare instans est principium temporis

unity of ipso prius, et requisitum ad suum esse. sicut et unitas

numbcr, so is -^ ' ' ^ . . ^

the point the se habet ad numerum, quin per idem punctus sic se

P'the'finc.°'" habet ad lineam. 20

2. If not, all Similiter: aliter contingeret auferri punctum a linea

aVine^couki bc '^o'^'^i'^^1'^'^^ •^'-™ ^^^^; "°" P^-^^s auferendo; et per idem successiveiy quemlibet punctum linee contingit auferri, et sic oinnes,

taken trom it, ^ ^ . ^ .. . •,-,

without cum hoc quod maneat eadem hnea; et sic quihbet ^ '°len"'th^ '** punctus linee per accidens continuat unam eius partem 25 Thus everv cum alia. Sed cum punctus sitaccidens, oportet [utl aliquod

point would bc . . ' , • 1 1

an accident as eius subiectum adequatum per se subiectat tales de-

substan^cc 'in nominaciones quales punctus accidentaliter recipit; ut

which it exists. nioveri. quiescere etc. Substancia ergo per se subiectans

But this is ' ^ . .. ° ^ . . .

impossible. punctum contmuantem partes hnee per se principiat 3o illam lineam ; et cum illa non possunt esse sine tali puncto, patet quod nuUus punctus potest auferri a linea, eadem manente ; quia sic contingeret corrumpere omnem punctum corporeitatis dande, servando illam. Continuatis ergo duabus pyramidibus, erunt puncta35 conalia immediata. 3. Thcrc must Similiter de inmediacione ubicacionum vel situum

"^ poi'nts''"^ indivisibilium, patet quod est dare tales inmediatas.

/rameif/a/e, i. c. Nani est dare duo puncta inmediata, ut patet de cor-

havmg no . . '^ '

spacc between poribus tangentibus se 2'" puncta. Sicut ergo taha 40

tw^bod^ie^s puncta sunt inmediata, sic ubicaciones vel situaciones

36. ut deest B.

CAP. IX. I.OGICA. 31

corum sunt inniediate. Et, cum illi situs manent ex- touch each

punctantes alia puncta, patet quod quandocunque altcr "f'^?'' '" "'i^ ' . '^ ^,. ' ^,.. ^ point onlv,

eorum erit occupatus aliquo punctali intra corpus, we have two reliquus erit occupatus punctali sibi inmediato; et per ^[.^'ai-tQ^cli^cacb 5 idem sequitur quod corpus pyramidis taneens medium ^^ other.

, . . , . . . . If the top ot

punctum B superncici plane eque distantis supernciei a pyramid is

orizontes, est superior quam B, cum tota pyramis per ''pohn li"of a^

totum sit supra B: et per idem, iacente illa pyramide ^"'".t?"' "f '"^'^ '^ . . ^-^ wil! bc abovc

super B planum, contingit ponere punctum conalem h; the top of

loalterius pyramidis super primam pyramidem, et sic in pyranii^d^^niav

infinitum ; ita quod ad omnem punctum linee erecte be placed

. ^ . . ^ . above its lop.

B iio" super medium punctum B | sit conus unius pyra- and so on, iill • i- a line is

midlS- ..... . tonncd.

Similiter de instantibus; videtur quod erunt inme- 4. Thcre must

- ]• .. • ^ 3 j ] I ■.. be immediatc

lodiata, quia est dare duo, quorum unum durabit usque mstants ; fov

ad B instans exclusive, et aliud durabit usque ad iJlud 'f t^^o beings

. ' ^ last, one till

instans mclusive, et non ultra. Et certum est quod est the instant B

dare quandiii utrumque durabit ; quia aliter non esset and^^thTot^cr

dare quam senex aliquis erit, aut quam diuturnum "^'^''^^''^■'^'.y' '''° ,. . ^ . , ^. ,.. . latter will last

20 erit aliquod successivum. Et sic, demtis aliis supenus longcr. tactis, certum est quod unum durabit diucius vel ultra reliquum perunum instans; quia aliter non essem senior quam ante fui, cum ante fui ita senex precise sicut homo qui incepit esse pro primo instanti mei, et nunc

25 desinit esse. Et idem sequitur, si continue intendam ^^'"^ ^^'i"'^

^ ,. consequence

motum meum vel actum merendi, et stem sub gradu flows from actus quem nunc habeo, et uno alio merente exclusive ''^rncri^ ° usque ad hoc instans, et nunc decedente. Deus enim exclusiveiy or

. , . . ,. , . . . mclusivelv

scit tales premiare proporcionahter ad intensissimos up to a givcu 1-^ogradus suorum meritorum; quia aUter noceret homini cairrcmuner°a\e

quod continuasset actum bonum, cum plus premiaretur ^^"^ mstant ot

,. . ... mcnt.

merendo solum 2^ medietate sui actus mentorii. Deus

ergo premiabit quemcunque 2"'' intensissimum gradum

sui meriti, si non ponat obicem.

35 Et conformiter videtur quod contingit unum dare ■''• ^-^t us 1 i~> • • 1- • •, •, , • . suppose the

ultra B mstans per mdivisibile, ut talem veritatem: A truth : /1 tangit aliquem punctum C, posito quod C sit noraen '°p(^l}i^t^ of'c'^ commune ad primam medietatem dati possibilis, et ad *^ ^signitying thc

,., . ,. . ,. . tirst half of

quamlibet partem imparem i'^ medietatis divise contra a line and all 40 medium punctum; et quod A in B instanti primo divisfops^^o^t the

second half;

1—2. exptates B. 5. ta"» B. 20. dem"' B. 21. et certum B.

36. zfte pro et stem B.

32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAl>. IX.

and iliat A gcis eleveniat ad medium punctum, continuando uniformiter tlie fiist^^half^^in motum suum super omnes partes proporcionales 2^^ me-

theinstantB: Jietatis: tunc natet quod A tangere C manebit usque then ths . ' . ^ ,. t^ • •

proposition wiii ad B instans, et mtnediate post B instans erit : ergo

imniediateiv duracio sua erit intnediata B instanti, ante et post; 5 before B, at 15, g^ pgj- iJem potest Deus proporcionare infinita taliter

and ^ ^ . , ^ . . ,.

immcdiately se extendencia per descnpciones situum punctualium '^*'*^'' inmediatorum vel quornodolibet aliter.

Therc are aiso Similiter est dare motus indivisibiles quo ad dura-

indivisible .... .

movements; cionem inmediate succedentes; ergo et mensuras instan- ^o also'ind1\-is*ib?c taneas, ipsos mensurantes. Antecedens patet de divisioni-

instants to 5^5 sunerficierum inmediatarum in corporibus contieuis measure them ,. . , ^,. . . 1 » ,■ • 1 •

by. dividendis contmue; ut, posito quod A dtvidens primo,

dWidc two dividat superficiem B aeris, et post superficiem inme-

contiguous diatarn C aque: patet quod dividentur distinctis divi- '^ surtaces, V. g. . . \ ./ . ^ ,. „ . ,- ■ ,

air and water, sionibus, pari evidencia qua aiiqua superficies dividetur

"two distn^^icr appropriata divisione, Et constat, cum divisio ponit divisions, dividi aliquid de presenti, quod est dare instancia in-

theretore an .^ ., ^ . . ' ^ , , ,. . , ,• -j-

indivisible mediata m quibus erit ita quod hoc dividens dividit

™oneTurface°™ istam superficiem. Aliter enim dividens divideret quot- 20

to anotlier. ijbet superficies quas nunquam taneeret, ut infimam

And thc .' ^ .,, . ^ .." ^T-

division of superficiam B pro iUo mstanti m quo tanget C. Et

talfe^ place^at nunqviam tangeret illam, nisi forte in instanti inmediate

separate precedente; sicut tota divisio B terminabitur inclusive instants. -^ ,.,,,. ' . . „ . „.,..,

ad illud mstans m quo mhma ems superhcies dividetur, 2D

cum continue usque ad illud instans manebit^ et non

Tiiis argnmcnt [j^ [Hq ygi pQg^ iHuJ propter nisum aeentis. Et idem

liolds in manv . '^ . ., ^ ^ • •, • •

othcr cascs,' sequitur de lummibus et quantitatibus qui mnovabuntur V. g. in the subito pro quolibet instanti istius hore 2'"" se tota, de hypothcsis pyramide circumrotata super multitudine punctorum 3o

thai ^verc dod ^ - . ,. .

successively per se servatorum sme Imea; ut posito quod Deus

a°id"re-c'reat^e annichilet Sortem, et post vivificet illum, et 3° adnichilet,

the samc gj- g\(~ gine fine, patet quod, subductis omnibus motibus

individnal , r ^ .

eternally, preter tales, foret tempus; quia prius et posterms suc-

' 'of*rnediat'°" cessivutn; et cum teinpus se habet ad divisibilitatem 35

creations and sicut motus et eius materia, patet quod illud tempus annihilations . . ' r -i r

■would be time. componetur ex instantibus.

Note that Et hic miror quare theolosi admittunt casum ultimum,

theologians . ^ .

admit the et tamen dicunt quod Deus non potest auferre punctum possibility of i- 1 • • i ]• 1 •i i- ..• i u t .^

this hypothesis, a linea | nisi addident ahum, nec continuare duast>'io

and are yet so Hneas ad invicem, nisi corrumpendo puncta extremalia inconsistent as 711

to dcny ihut.

iiid-, B. !.=>. d-f'<'^ B. 2X. Imibci B. 3S. ca^-tilti™ B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 33

ct generando terminum communcm, cum summe libcre Hc could takc i- ,. • -4. 1 ^ ,. ■\-u ^ » ^^ om point from

contradictone agit ad extra ; et quihbet punctus potest ^ linc witbout per se esse dependens ab alio. addmg another.

Similiter, ex modo loquendi de difformitate motuum ^- Agaui;

' 7 ... every unitormly

3 quo ad tempus, patet idem. Nam motus uniformiter varied motion

3- cc • ■ ^ ^ y .. • ^ ] j must include

dmormis, in quantum talis, termmatur ad gradum i],e degree of inclusive; quia aliter non esset dare gradum eis inten- i"tensity at

" . '^ whicli it

sissimus vel medium, et per consequens non esset de- arrivcs. scriptibilis aliqua descripcione; quia dicere quod gradus

load quem terminatvir exclusive, qui non est in mobili, mensurat eius velocitatem vel uniformitatem, est plana contradiccio, cum medium requirat extrema illius cuius est medium. Et dicere quod gradus medius, qui non est extremum vel terminus illius motus, est plane de-

i5 mencie.

Gradus ergo medius motus uniformiter difformis Thus, when

quo ad tempus, erit gradus utriusque medietatis suc- ^ hain^s "^

cessive; quia aliter non continuaret unam medietatem '"tensity, there . . . . . . must be the

latitudmis cum alia. Continua enim sunt talia quorum same degree

1. • . . ^ hii^ .. • • ot intensity for

2o ultima sunt unum : ut agregatum ex 2""^ termmis con- the end ot liie tinuatoruin est unum commune utrique continuatorum Hrst and the

. . beginning ot

2'" partes eius. Nichil enim continuat primo aliud cum the second haif.

alio, nisi fuerit illius quod continuat; ut punctus non the movement

est terminus communis lineis ipso continuatis, nisi sit would not be

. ^ . ■ continued.

2? punctus utriusque illorum. Et ita, generaliter loquendo

de continuacione, terminacione et velocitate successivo-

rum incidit homo, velit, nolit, in istam sentenciam.

Sic enim ponunt auctores quod habitantes sub polis .,^'.'"-';'''^J|°" ^*"^

•^ . . ^ . ^ this by the fact

zodiaci habent duos dies in anno, in quorum uno that at the

3o habent instans pro nocte, et in altero instans pro die, is^^once a' vMr

emergentibus illis subito ex signis. Et illud plane patet °- "is'it, /"d

° , ^ , . once a dav,

ex hoc quod sol, describendo tropicum estiwum, solum of but onc

.. .. j^ r; •!! j^ .. instant in

per mstans tanget zodiacum nxum illo die; et cum duration.

zodiacus fixus sit orizon habitantibus sub circulo artico,

35sequitur quod solum per instans deficit sol in illa die

ab existencia supraorizontaliter habitancium ; et ita per

idem instans vel agregatum ex paucis instantibus, erit

illis nox. Supponatur enim [definicio] qtdd nominis ter-

minorum, modo quo auctores locuntur.

40 Similiter, ut credo, nuUus theoloeus neearet quin 7- God can,

' . ^ o o "1 absolutely

Deus de potencia absoluta potest facere substanciam speaking make

a substance of

thc size of a

point;

2y. lo'^' 13. ?2. t°picu 13. 38. dehnicio deext \i.

34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

punctalem, vel condensando, vel noviter causando, vel

3" faciendo spiritum esse in situ punctali et annichilando

omnem aliam creaturam preter talem spiritum servatum

immotum; et tunc patet quod punctualitas vel punctus,

que est substancia huiusmodi esse punctalis, est actus 5

positivus [in] illa substancia, sive sit separabile sive

and Hc can inseparabile. Punctus ergo potest esse. Nec dubium

sev^eral ot^such quin, si Deus potest unum punctaie producere, potest

points so as to et quodlibet iuxtaponere. Nec dubium quin situs essent touch each ^ .'^ . . . ^ .

other. correspondenter luxtapositi, cum situs sit subiectum lo

And thus out situari. Et ultra patet quod Deus potest ex talibus non

inextTnded quantis facere unum quantum : quod sic ostenditur

substances, an argumento ad hominem. Creet Deus ad omnem situm

extended *-' .

substance punctalem mundi unam substanciam punctalem, et "supposeThat^^^^^^-hil^^ P°^^ omnem substanciam continuam, servando i3

God created punctales substancias inmotas; et patet quod Deus est such substances ^ . ' . "^. . . .

in cvery point adhuc per tantum locum sicut ruit m prmcipio, et per

and^^then consequens est tantus locus; vel saltem contingit tantum

annihilated locum fieri ex illis punctalibus, sicut prius. Aliter enim

all continued . '^ i A

substance. non esset distancia, nec punctuale tiuens super alia 20 remain^as^it punctualia posset moveri localiter; vit iste globus suc-

^yas, and the cessive circumductus, causaret duracionem successivam, things in space ^^ . ....

also; Posito ergo quocunque tali accidente contmuo, oportet

ponere subiectum eius continuum, et illud esset com-

positum ex punctalibus, quia illa forent eius principia 20

And if this is intrinseca. | Nec dubito quin, admisso hoc pro possi-Biii' I dc^fv*any%nc ^^^^y omnes philosophi mundi non haberent infallibilem

to prove that evidenciam ad concludendum quod non est sic de facto.

it 18 not so at ^ . . ^ , ,

present: Nam, conrormiter sicut tunc respondendum esset ad

agauist^ft"'* argumenta in oppositum, respondendum est et nunc. 3o

would havc jvjec adhuc areumentum plus concludit nunc quam tunc to be refutcd ,, ° . ^ . , . ^ , . .

then as we concluderet, nec experiencia, vel auctoritas, vel quivis

now"^and^are alius locus efficacius probat nunc quod non sic

of no more est, quam tunc probaret. Et negans puncta vel value now than ,..,...,.,. , . ' ,

ihey would be talia indivisibuia esse, nec vere loquitur de instanti 00

then. temporis nec de inotibus subitis, et generaliter de

continuacionibus accidencium. Nec arguet efficaciter

contra ponentes composicionem continui ex non quantis,

nisi prius stabiliret nullum huiusmodi posse esse: quod

faciendo nimis diu exceptaret principale intentum. 40

Thc truth that Argumentando eciam pro isto puncto, multum expedit

fufure^are habere concessum quod omnia preterita vel futura sunt

present to God,

i">. in deest B. 12. o' H.

But

Grosseteste

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 35

Deo prcsencia: tunc enim sequitur omne quod erit is of great usc

,• 1- • ...... T^ .. • ] • 1- • ] in this matter.

aliquahter, ipsum est tahter; et per idem, si aliquid

dividet superficiem, vel erit summe propinquum ipsum,

sic sc habet: et hoc multum valet pro intento.

5 In oppositum est philosophus 6° phisicorum, 3° ^^q FirstObjection :

celo, et primo de generacione, per multas pregnantes many places,

raciones et consideraciones difficiles contra Democritum contradict this.

et Platonem : ut puta de tactu, de mediacione cuius-

cunque continui, de divisione cuiuscunque continui in

loinfinitum, de continuacione indivisibilis cum alio, et

multis similibus que postea tangentur.

Sed ad illud respondet Linconiensis, dicens quod

Aristoteles intellexit nullum continuum distincte sensi- points out that

, •, • ^^ ^ • Aristotle has in

bile componi ex non quantis tanquam partes eius nu- mind that i5meralibus. Et vocantur partes numerales partes quan- which is

. r T senstbly

titative, que aliquociens finite quo ad hominem sumpte continuous; constituunt suum totum, vel maius; et tamen impossi- course, cannot bile est non quantum esse partem vel componere con- ''^. <^°'"P°1'^^ °*

^ . . ' ' inextended

tinuum sic sensibile. Verumptamen apud Deum est parts, such that

2onotum ex quot non quantis mundus componitur, et distincuish or

quecunque pars eius corporea; sicut notum est sibi S°P-^)} the''i. ^ ^ . . . . • But God can ;

quota pars quantitativa anguli recti est angulus contin- as He knows

r-Tj nr .. _n] ^ ^ what part of a

gencie quam Euchdes, 3° elementorum 25°, demonstrat nght angle is

esse minimam speciem aneulorum, et partem anguli 'H? sn^.aiifst ot . . . ." . ' . ^ all, called the

20 rectihnei. Et sic dicit Aristoteles, primo posteriorum, angle ot

punctam esse causam hnee, cum ponitur in eius diffi- '^Aristo")" nicione tanquam prius naturahter. Ideo dicit Linconiensis admits that the

^ . . . .... pomt causes

quod ista opmio non contranatur sensui Aristotehs, the linc. sed sequitur ex eodem. Nec est possibile punctuale o^nV'' 'iT^not*' Sotaneere vel continuari cum aliquo 2™ intellectum quem opposed to his

.'-' . . ^ . . ^ doctnne, but

Aristoteles exponit de termmo; quia supponit omne tale tbllows from it. habere ultimum.

Verumtamen unum indivisibile potest tangere reli- One point can,

, , , ■ j j •.. in a wjde scnse

quum, large loquendo; quia esse ad eundem situm touch another 35 indivisibilem positum cum alio; et sic potest continuari '• '^- ''e in the

^ ' ^ . same place

cum alio large loquendo, quia facere unum continuum with it.

cum alio. Et compositum ex 3"="=^ punctis, vel quotlibet pohitr/n^odd'

number can have halves ;

24. miam B. 3o. if™ B. 3i. det'uno B. 34. oe B.

22 — 23. Angulus contingencie. VVe find further on (p. 48), ihat the angle of continence is the one formed by a circle taii- gent to a right line.

3*

36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF

CAP. IX.

foi- in oiic imparibus, habet medietates; quia sicut medium dupli- *'^must''nor'* ^i^S"^ dicitur, vel per abnegacionem extremorum, vel iicccssarily bc pgj- eque distanciam ab extremis, sic est dare duplicem

equal, ^ ^ ^ . '^.

though in medietatcm : scilicet^ medietatem, que est pars simpli-

**" must. '^" citer subdupla ad indivisibiliter plus vel minus suo tota 5

(et taliter loquitur arithmeticus de medietate maiori et

medietate minorinumeri imparis). Et 2° modo, sed non

primo, habet omnis quantitas medietates, i. e. duas

partes quantitativas incommunicantes, quarum neutra

indivisibiliter excedit reliquam totum equaliter constitu- 10

entes, licet ternarius et omnis quantitas habeat duas

medietates equales ad alium sensum.

Ai-istoilc Nec demonstrat Aristoteles oppositum, sicut nec de-

"^'contrary^ to"^ monstrat, si aliquod sit instans, ipsum est principium

^.th'?- unius temporis 1 et finis alterius ; cum primum instansBiii'

Neither ^ . . ^ .... . .

geometricians non precessit mstans vel tempus, sed capit alias signi-

phi^io^op^hers ficaciones ex famosis modis loquendi philosophorum have anything naturalium, quorum non interest tractare de partibus

to do here, 10 r . .* ., , . ...

they consider punctuahbus in philbsophia naturah^ m qua demonstratur

beVonfin^^o causa per eflfectus, demonstracione quia est, cuius prin- 20

cxperience and cipium est experiencia vel sensus. Punctus autem non

scns6. Now tlie \>o\\n est sensibilis vel ymaginabilis; ideo tractatus eius non

'* 'nor^even''''^' P^'^'^^'^^'^^^ specialiter geometre, qui solum de ymagina-

imaginable; bilibus pertractat directe, sicut nec naturali philo-

it belongs to , ^:, , .,, , ' , , . ^

the province sopho. Sed illud conservandum est metaphysico et 23

metap°l!ysics. aristoteUco.

No number of Unde impossibile est quod aHquis numerus substan-

points^c^an be ciarum vel punctorum, vel aliud preter deum sit simpli-

infinite; God citer infinitum, cum omnis talis numerus habet deum alone is so. ' . . . „

God knows hnem suum extrinsecus hnientem et ultimum eius punc- o<»

points"go"to tuale finiens intrinsecus. Yramo deus satis noscit quo-

make up a modo omne quadratum per se sensibile inteeratur ex

square or anv ... '^. . .. . ,. . ., ....

other figurc partibus minimis et pnncipns eorum indivisibiiibus

percefved by cumulatis. Et sic dicitur de qualibet alia figura prin-

the senses. cipiata ab indivisibilibus primi numeri, ut figurati. 33

Novit eciam in qua proporcione quicunque numerus

punctorum se habet ad alium; et de istis habemus nos

If one inseparabilem ignoranciam. Scimus tamen quod, si una linc V. 2. is twice a's long linea fuerit 2P'^ ad aliam, tunc numerus punctorum

contai°Vuvice ^'"S est duplex ad numerum punctorum alterius : et sic 4°

as many dg simihbus. Verumptamen non possumus scire nisi

points; '^ ^

but we cannot know exactly

2. abne"™ 13. 7. i sto jcro 2" B. 23 — 24. ymag''' B. ^o.aris^^B.

32. 4^2 B. 33—34. expt-f B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 37

sciencia confusa et communiter dicta aliquod taie ante- that it is twice

cedens; ut nemo mundi scit distincte quantum est hoc j^jgg^j*"^' "l^ing

corpus, quodcunque demonstretur: quam velox est iste 'eistive to size, r ' ^ T _ ^ ^ ... movement, &c.

motus; quod hoc est medium instans, vel pnncipium

5 huius diei. Et sic de aliis singulis que supponimus

taliter se habere, quando contingit nos loqui de talibus

illis. Ideo dixerunt philosophi quod de singularibus,

propter suam intlnitatem, non est sciencia. Omnem ergo 'infinitc' is a

numerum qui excedit ingenium nostrum ad aptandum .'^•"'P "^^f. ^^^ ^ . '^ • /^ • '°'" denoting a

losibi terminum specificum naturalem vocamus innnitum, number in- c 3-^ • j- V • • -c ■ conceivably

sicut prorunditas maris dicitur in una signihcacione areat^ "

esse infinita; et talia que sunt hominibus inmensura- '^ '* "^ *'',!^

' . ^ 7* . . sense ot

bilia et illa voco infinita 2^ quid, vel quo ad homi- relative

^ • • ^ 11- j infinitude that

nem, et ita intelligo quandocunque pono numerum | emplov it

i5infinitum. when speaking

ot number. Unde, ymaginato quod Deus successive addat ad A Suppose that

^ I- ^ ^- j !• * God adds one

punctum alia puncta, continuando unam lineam, est pQj„( ^^

dare instans quando numerus punctorum erit 2™ quid another so as

. ^. . . ..„. ,. to make a Ime,

infinitus uni, et quando erit 2"^ quid infinitus alteri; there will come 20 et sic diversi (2"^ perspicacitatem suam) habebunt diver- the^num^beV^ls sos maximos numeros illis finitos, et diversos numeros mfinite to one

. . ..... ^ . . . . man, and then

minimos illis innnitos. Nec est mconveniens unitatem to another, additam vel subtractam a numero facere quod quis hfs'^ p^owef ot' non sufficiat distincte totum apprehendere confuse, cum conceiving jt;

, ,• . •,, , n ■ and tlie

25 cognoscatur de quocunque tali quod lilud esset hnitum; addition of a

et si esset duplicatum, quadruplatum; et sic quamdiu niale^sThe scivero numerare. Est ergo dare maximum numerum difference

quem quis potest distincte simul apprehendere, et nullum infinite and

numerum sibi infinitum excedentem solum per unitatem "'^sen."e.^"^

3o quem non sufficit distincte apprehendere. Omne enim The greatest ,■ ■ •, •, • ,1 , ■ 1- ■ possible

distmcte sensibile continet ultra hoc quod scio distincte number of ages

calculare indivisibilia 2'^ quid infinita. Unde maxima 'nu^mber^

multitudo evorum est numerus maximus possibilis, sed t.hough time is „ . , . , . ^ . mfinite in the

hnitus, et per consequens multitudo instancium, ter- future, it is not

35 minorum, vel parcium talium quaremlibet est finita; no°is°it at ail licet tempus sit infinitum a parte post, quo ad finem infinite in the intrinsecum, sed non quo ad finem extrinsecum (qui est Deus) omnium novissimum. Et sic dicitur de pro- porcionibus quod repugnat aliquam esse simpliciter

4oinfinitam. Tempus ergo est sic infinitum a parte post; sed non concipio quod aliquid possit esse sic infinitum

33. enou B. 36. a)[>p« 13.

38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

a parte prius, nec quod aliquod tempus posset anterio-

I cannot rari ; nec quod linea simpliciter infinita 2"^ unum

'^straighnine extremum I possit circumduci vel figi aliter terminoBii2"

infinitely long, ^^^ propius per eius talem amocionem, ut communiter forming 3. \ ^ ^- ^ ^ >

circumference yraaginamur homines. Unde satis est pro sensu philo- 5 end any\vhere, sophi quod omne continuum sit 2"^ quid divisibile in

We thus admit Jnfinitum et ultra omnem numerum finitum a viatore that the _ _ _ _ ■ n •

extended is distincte noscibilem. Unde volens argumentare mfini-

'div^sible tatem simpliciter per communes exponentes, nunquam relatiuelyto us ; ^j.Q-^^'^-^^ illum saltum monstruosum : et sic in infinitum. 10

no other ^

infinitude of Sed do ultimum cuiuscunque corporis, superficiei, linee,

division can be 1 £• -^- .^ • • ^ • t-* * * 1 • j

proved. vel hniti termmo intnnseco. b.t patet solucio ad pnmam

racionem factam. Second 2° principaliter argumentatur quod nullum infinitum

All Mnfinites', sit reliquo maius; quia sit A linea pedalis, cuius puncta i5 accordmg to gjj^^ subdupla in multitudine ad lineam fBl bipedalem ;

this theory, i^ . . L J f ■^

contain the et pono quod C et D, uniformiter movendo, describant

same number •^v jl-u ^ ^ -j.. i ^ ^

of points. For istas Imeas adequate in hora: et tunc videtur quod tot if two mobiles pi-gcise puncta tangeret C in ista hora sicut D, quia

pass over i^ _ 1 o _ _ . . "

spaces utrinque precise tot quot instancia erunt in ista hora; 20 equa^i^^to'! and ^o quod pro quolibet instanti tanget solum unum rur^^oVtlte "^^'^u™ punctum. Cum ergo quecunque sint equalia same number alicui tercio sunt equalia inter se, videtur quod uterque

of instants) . ^ -^ !• 1.. • • .^ ..

they pass over maximus numerus punctorum sit equahs aiten, sicut est the same equalis maximo numero instancium huius hore. Et idem 25

number 01 ^

points. deducitur, ponendo A et B circulari concentrice; tunc Or if the two . ' ^ ^ . • d . . ■ 4 .^ •

lines A and B precise tot puncta sunt m B quot sunt semidyametn

circumfere^nces ^^ ^^^° ^'^ centrum ; et tot sunt puncta in A: quia que-

of concentrical libet talis dyameter tangeret in A disparem punctum,

circles, then . . . _^ ^ , .

there are as sicut tangit m B, cum omnes tales primo concurent 3o

many points in jj^ centro, eo quod aliter non esset recte. Et idem

B as there are ' _ ^ _

radii of its deducitur de infinitis punctis existentibus in eodem situ

and justas indivisibili applicatis infinitis pyramidalibus 2"^ conos

t'oi^'tfie'rad^'i ^'^ eundem punctum in aere. Et ad id fiunt multa

are the same argumenta mathematicalia et geometricalia, reducendo 35

from the . , . _,„ • i^i 1 • •

centre. opposita conclusione 10™^ et cumshbet conclusionis

Ansiver. Euclidis It is not true E,ucuuib.

that either of Et hic dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem C et D the mobiles ,., . . , . ,

passes over pro quohbet mstanti huius hore tangere novum punc-

"©'rTe mstant'' ^^"^' ^'^^ tarde movendo. Pro quo notandum quod, 40

I. a|3p9 B. [(i. B deest B. 17. et deest B. 35. redu'^'' B.

36. g"«B.

CAP. IX. I.OGICA. 39

dato puncto velocissime moto qui, gracia exempli^ sit Aloni; the punctus equinoxialis; ille pro quolibet instanti temporrs poin't"i*n the adquirit et deperdit situm punctalem et nullus alius ^^y passes over

^ . . . . one point in

tardius motus; sed aliquis exceptat per duo instancia, cach instant;

5 aliquis per 4"'" instancia, et sic proporcionaliter 2"^ quod all others pass

tardius movetur illo. Nam motus celi est minimus pos- accordiii^g as

sibilis quo ad multum de situ describendum in parvo they move

... ... .,, slower, for the

tempore, eo quod est velocissimus possibilis; et ille est movement of mensura omnium aliorum motuum; non solum regu- mo^st^rapld'^

lolariter dictus mensurare temnus et aliorum motuum possibie

. . ' . . and not only

quantitates, sed efliciens omnes alios motus propnos, is taken to

cum, cessante illo motu, cessarent alteraciones et motus reany^^does

locales quicunque mobilium non intellectivorum. Patet measure all

^ . ; . . others.

ergo quod quilibet punctus recte motus vel circulanter

I .=) per horarn tardius quam punctus velocissime motus,

tanto pauciores situs adequate describet, quanto tardius

movebitur.

Et ex istis potest patere, cum nichil potest velocius Note that this

moveri motu successivo quam movetur equinoccialis, '^fpufif that\i,/

20 et cum Deus non potest creare maiorem mundum quam world cannot ^ . . ^ be greater than

potest circumducere, sequitur quod non maior mundus it is; for God . . • • r 4. ... • • * cannot create a

potest esse, nisi forte posset moveri successive motu world too

subito, stante continuitate parcium: vel forte Deus posset s^^^^ \° ^^

, . S . . revolved thus,

spissius ponere punctalia in mundo, slante eius circum- unless under 25 ferencia in eodem situ, ita quod poli possent quantum- hypotheses

libet plus distare sine eorum motu. Conclusio princi- ^^"'^"^" ,^!'^,^ery

. . . \, unlikelv.

palis de posicione mundi in magnitudine, situ, ngura,

et terminis inseparatis consequentibus est multis eligibi-

lior, quam alie recitate.

3o Patet ergo ex dictis quod argumentum 2"" peccat Thus in this II V, • ^ ■ ■ j . I 1 r.. argument the

H ii^^in materia, capiens quod omne punctum | localiter assumption is

motum pro quolibet instanti adquirit situm punctalem : it^™"^h

quod non est verum, cum sicut intercisiones talium urged ihat if

adquisicionum proporcionaliter ad tarditates motuum. just as weil

3.T Sed argumentatur contra illud per hoc quod tales j^j^^^jj^^^J^^i^^^Jj.'

motus non essent continui, cum, pari evidencia vel rest during

, ., , . . .,,. that time,

maiori, mobile per horam quiesceret quiete uhs oppo- yet we see the sita; experiuntur tamen tales motus esse contra nos. ccntrary.

10. doctus B. 26—27. Con" pu'"' B. 28. gntibg H.

2. Punctus Eqidnoxialis. Doubtless the point where the equator is crossed by the echptic, and which is supposed to turn round on the equatorial circle once a day.

40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IX.

We answcr Hic dicitur quod loquendum est de continuacione mo-

of movementus tuum quo ad tempus vel quo ad subiectum, sicut di-

apparent, not cendum est de continuitate formarum substancialium

continuity is. et simplicium in mixtis, et de densitate ac raritate cor-

The senses porum. Pro quo declarando, notandum 2"'' sentenciam 5

"^uTiiTthfs^ perspectivorum et communem experienciam, quod maxima

matter. decepcio contingit in sensibus, in significando continui-

When the time tatem motus. Cuius racio est, quia tam ad situs quam

phenonienon i^s ad motus significacionem requiritur tempus conveniens;

vcry short, q^ j^jgQ parvitas temporis facit quotlibet illusiones: ut lo

there are many . . . ^ , . ., .^, . .

illusions. ticio circumductus m noctibus videtur causare ignitum brand"'swifn" circulum, sicut et punctus sensibilis rubricatus in base round, seems g^bg troci ccleriter circumducti; ut exemplat Avicenna

a circle ot hre; . . ... -^ .

a red point on 6° naturalium, et Boccius m prmcipio musice sue, et forms' a° ci°rclc experiencia communis de ioculantibus docet idem. Eti3 too, when it patet quod non est credendum sensui generaliter in

revolves. ^ ^ ... . .

Reason, not talibus, sed pocms racioni, errorem sensus corrigenti.

lu^d^e i^n^s^uch^ Unde de singularibus sensibus habemus exilem scien-

matters. ciam, quam aliqui vocant scienciam communiter dictam

scienciam putativam, probabilem, thopicam, sive fidem. 20

We do not Ex ista proporcione ergo temporis convenientis, ex uno

nii^nutr latere latet sensum talis parvus motus velox, et ex alio

motions and latere manet in sensu communi et ymaginativa species rests distinctly, ... 1 •, • -i j

but there is a et mdicia servata de coloribus et sitibus, dum motus

fe^eJi^/g^tlTat fuerint celeriter repetiti; et hinc fit talis illusio. 2?

produces the 3° supponatur ex supra dictis quod sicut motus

idea of ^^ ^ . . ^ . .

continuous agregatus vocatur motus mter cums partes mtercidunt

This^nwtlon is multe quietes vel multa substancialiter illi impertinencia,

thus an proporcionaliter dicendum est quo ad intercisionem

aggregate or .^ ^ *

many mstancmm de quandalitate vel tempore agregato. Sic 3o

'^man)''^'rests"'^ enim oportet philosophum loqui, ampliando verba de

presenti, quando loquitur de huiusmodi agregatis; ut

patet de stirpe vel genere, de religione vel ordine, de

populo vel quacunque alia multitudine.

Continuity of His premissis dicitur 3° quod dupliciter dicitur mo- 35

a^p^ly^e^it/i^^^^to tus continuus; vel simpliciter ut solum motus, vel

movement velocissimus, inter cuius partes non est aliqua invasio without any . . ' . '^ . ^ .

intermingled quietis opposite; vel motus contmuus quo ad ems

m^^vem^e^nt^of primam mensuram, licet intercidant multe quietes oppo-

which the ^[^q^ ej- Jstum voco motum continuum 2"^ quid. Et^o pnmary , ., ,

measure is taliter oportet quemcunque philosopnantem ponere continuous.

I?. deiocula'''' B. ?6. sol B.

CAP. IX. LOGICA. 41

omnem progressionem, omnem tremorem cum suis To the second consequentibus esse continua, ut sunt soni cordarum, p°ogress?on, et eeneraliter omnes soni vel loquele; cum quotlibet ^"'^ undulatory

?.. . . ..... ^ . movement,

similibus, in quibus sunt quotlibet intercisiones, racione such as sound,

5 motuum reflexorum, licet sensus decepti putant talia to be unEroken

simpliciter esse continua. '° °"'" senses.

Istis notatis, dicitur quod quilibet motus successivus All successive

est modo suo continuus. Unde datus motus est con- cont?nuous,' for

tinue per suam primam mensuram, hoc est, aeereeatum '* exists dunng . "^ . ^ ....... '^ . ^ continuous

10 ex instantibus vel quandalitatibus indivisibilibus, m aggrcgate ot

quorum quolibet movetur mobile talis motus; quia pro '"^^tants-

nuUo signo illius mensure desistit. Et proporcionaliter

dicendum est de quiete opposita habente mensurain

incommunicantem sed commixtam. Et patet solucio. Sic . ^^'•■'^'op"'"^"*

. is a contmuous

irenim est motus augmentacionis contmuus, hcet multe motion, though quietes intercidant (ut vere dicit Commentator); et ita " ™rrested" ^^ continuat, quantumlibet tarde motum. suam mocionem i":^?"^^ •'

^ . -^ . . , fulfils itself

respectu sue prime mensure. Nec est mconveniens, sed continuously in consonum racioni^ vocare agregatum ex indivisibilibus " '^onime''"'^'^ 20 aut divisibilibus distantibus substanciam, quantita- There is

D 9» , ,. ... . ,.„ .